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PROLOGUE 
In recent years, courts have decided a number of cases in which 
private organizations discriminated against people based solely on 
their race, gender, sexual orientation, or other immutable traits. For 
example, in 2000, the Boy Scouts of America revoked a New Jersey 
man’s membership in the Boy Scouts because he was gay.1 New Jer-
sey’s supreme court held that the Boy Scouts’ action violated New 
Jersey’s anti-discrimination law.2 Notwithstanding the state court’s 
holding, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the First 
Amendment prevented any court from forcing the Boy Scouts to 
keep a gay man as a member of its private group. 
A great number of discriminating private organizations, like the 
Boy Scouts, are tax-exempt charities that receive significant govern-
ment and public financial support as a result of their eligibility for 
various tax benefits. What if the Boy Scouts, like many private white 
supremacist groups, decided that black people are not entitled to 
membership? What about handicapped people? The elderly? Women? 
The issue is, should we permit our tax system to fund groups that 
engage in invidious discrimination based on race, gender, disability, 
age, or sexual orientation? Many would agree that private groups 
(whether tax-supported or not) should have the freedom to decide 
on the membership of their organizations by use of certain prefer-
ences, such as those allowed under lawful affirmative action plans. 
However, most would also undoubtedly agree that we should not 
allow tax monies to fund private groups that discriminate in such 
harmful ways against minority groups. Unfortunately, as currently 
interpreted, federal laws that define eligibility for the type of tax 
benefits received by charities like the Boy Scouts do not clearly, ex-
plicitly, and effectively prohibit harmful discriminatory behavior by 
these groups.3 Indeed, despite calls for an end to tax benefits for the  
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (invalidating, on First 
Amendment grounds, application of state anti-discrimination law against Boy Scouts’ exclusion 
of scout leader solely because scout leader was admitted homosexual). 
 2. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999) (holding that BSA, as 
a “place of public accommodation” under New Jersey law, N.J.S.A. 10:5–4, cannot deny per-
sons “accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges . . . because of . . . sexual orienta-
tion”). 
 3. See generally David A. Brennen, The Power of The Treasury: Racial Discrimination, 
Public Policy and “Charity” in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389 (2000), for 
background discussion of this issue. 
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Boys Scouts in the wake of the recent Supreme Court ruling,4 the 
Boy Scouts still receive tax benefits and still exclude gays from mem-
bership.5 
To combat harmful discrimination by private tax-supported 
groups, society should, at a minimum, maximize use of all currently 
existing legal tools. One such tool used by the federal government 
against private groups (whether tax-supported or not) is the condi-
tioning, under civil rights laws, of the receipt of federal financial as-
sistance (FFA) on the recipient’s agreement not to discriminate. 
However, these civil rights laws have not been interpreted broadly 
enough to apply to private, tax-supported organizations based solely 
on their receipt of tax benefits. Instead, one must show that the or-
ganization, in addition to its tax support, receives other types of fed-
eral financial support (such as government grants or loans) that may 
constitute FFA.6 
The scope of coverage of these statutory civil rights laws could be 
significantly increased by adopting an express policy that prohibits 
particular tax-supported groups, like tax-exempt charities, from en-
gaging in wrongful discrimination. If Congress were ever to consider 
the matter again, it could adopt such a policy by enacting appropri-
ate federal legislation. But even without new legislation, there is 
sound basis to interpret existing federal tax and civil rights laws as 
supporting the proposition that charities, solely by virtue of their 
 
 4. See, e.g., Commentary, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Neptune, N.J.), July 18, 2000, at A17 
(“If they want to openly discriminate, whether it’s to bar gays, left-handers or brown-eyed 
people, then they need to become totally private. No free use of public facilities, no tax breaks, 
no assistance that involves public money, no free advertising and no public subsidization what-
soever.”). 
 5. This statement is not intended as a political statement about the social acceptability 
and advisability of laws favoring or disfavoring homosexuality. Others have quite adequately 
addressed that matter. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Heterosexual Privilege and the Internal Reve-
nue Code, 34 U.S.F. L. Rev. 465 (2000) (noting many ways in which the Internal Revenue 
Code disadvantages homosexuality as compared to heterosexuality). Instead, this statement is 
merely intended to highlight that an organization whose activities violate a principle contained 
in state law—that discrimination against homosexuals by places of public accommodation is 
wrong—is entitled to engage in invidious discrimination while receiving public tax benefits. 
 6. Though many state statutes like those in New Jersey prohibit discrimination based 
on one’s sexual orientation, federal civil rights statutes (as currently written and interpreted) do 
not prohibit such discrimination. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT § 
10.06 (3d ed. 2000). See also Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 
1984) (“[H]omosexuals and transvestites do not enjoy Title VII protection.”); DeSantis v. 
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[W]e conclude that Title 
VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’ discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender 
and should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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preferred tax status, receive FFA and are thus prohibited from engag-
ing in invidious discrimination. This article explains why such an in-
terpretation is appropriate as public policy, consistent with the un-
derlying purposes of existing civil rights legislation, and sound tax 
policy. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Many civil rights statutes prohibit discrimination based on race, 
gender, disability, and age in programs or activities that receive FFA.7 
These laws direct government agencies that award FFA to ensure 
compliance with the “nondiscrimination” requirement8 and promul-
gate rules that interpret the phrase FFA.9 Courts also interpret the 
phrase FFA for these civil rights statutory purposes.10 The basic con-
sensus of agencies and courts is that FFA refers to funds received di-
rectly or indirectly from the federal government.11 Thus, private enti-
ties receiving federal grants or loans are subject to coverage by these 
 
 7. See, e.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (“No 
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”); Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) (“No person in the United States shall, on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance  
. . . .”); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) (“No otherwise qualified indi-
vidual with a disability in the United States, as defined in [29 U.S.C. § 706(20)], shall, solely 
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance . . . .”). 
 8. See, e.g., Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1682. Title IX provides: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal finan-
cial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or con-
tract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to ef-
fectuate the provisions of [§ 1681 of Title IX] with respect to such program or 
activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be 
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial 
assistance in connection with which the action is taken. 
Id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (concluding that college with 
students receiving federal grants was a recipient of FFA). But see NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 
459 (1999) (concluding that dues received from member institutions did not constitute federal 
financial assistance even though the member institutions were recipients of federal financial 
assistance); cf. Richard Foss v. Chicago, 817 F.2d 34 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the Fire 
Department of the City of Chicago was not a recipient of federal financial assistance because 
the City of Chicago received federal funding). 
 11. See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 563. 
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civil rights laws as direct recipients of FFA.12 Further, private entities 
that receive fees from direct recipients of FFA are subject to coverage 
as indirect recipients.13 Yet, what about recipients of tax benefits in 
the form of exemptions, credits, or deductions? Should tax-exempt 
charities that receive no other direct or indirect federal financial 
benefits be covered by civil rights laws because of their tax-favored 
status as recipients of FFA? Social justice advocates would likely say, 
“Yes.”14 
Two federal district courts have addressed the meaning of FFA in 
the context of tax exemptions or deductions.15 However, these 
courts reached different conclusions. In McGlotten v. Connally, a 
federal district court concluded that certain federal tax benefits are 
FFA for purposes of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 Later, 
in Bachman v. American Society of Clinical Pathologists, a different 
federal district court reached the opposite conclusion—that tax-
exemption alone is not FFA as required by section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973.17 
 
 12. See id. 
 13. See, e.g., id. 
 14. The term “social justice” has been defined in many ways. For example, one scholar 
defines it as 
that branch of the virtue of justice that moves us to use our best efforts to bring 
about a more just ordering of society—one in which people’s needs are more fully 
met. It solves the problem of assignability because it is something due from every-
one whose efforts can make a difference to everyone whose needs are not met as 
things stand. I do not owe the man on the grate a place to live, but I do owe him 
whatever I can do to provide a social order in which housing is available to him. I do 
not owe any poor person a share of my wealth, but I owe every poor person my best 
effort to reform the social institutions by which I am enriched and he or she is im-
poverished. 
Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Social Justice and Liberation, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619, 620–21 
(1996). Drawing on this definition, the term “social justice,” as used in this article, is intended 
to refer to the concept of justice that recognizes a societal obligation (not just an individual 
one) to provide appropriate remedies for harm to others caused by legal, moral, or cultural 
structures instituted by society. Thus, for example, it is socially just for society to engage in 
race-based affirmative action and other efforts aimed at correcting the long term effect of in-
vidious societal discrimination against blacks. See also discussion infra note 58 and accompany-
ing text. 
 15. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Bachman v. Ameri-
can Soc’y of Clinical Pathologists, 577 F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.J. 1983). 
 16. See McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 462; see also discussion infra notes 157–91 and ac-
companying text. 
 17. See Bachman, 577 F. Supp. at 1265; see also discussion infra notes 192–204 and 
accompanying text. 
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The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide if tax bene-
fits are FFA under federal civil rights statutes.18 However, the Su-
preme Court has addressed the related issue of whether the govern-
ment’s grant of certain tax benefits should be analyzed as 
government expenditures or as government neutrality for constitu-
tional law purposes.19 The problem is that the Court uses expendi-
ture analysis20 in some contexts and neutrality analysis21 in others, 
thus failing to provide clear guidance on how tax benefits should be 
analyzed under federal civil rights statutes.22 
 
 18. While the Court has not provided specific guidance on whether tax benefits are FFA 
for civil rights statutory purposes, it has provided general guidance on the meaning of this ju-
risdictional term. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 563 (1984); see also discussion 
infra notes 130–56 and accompanying text. 
 19. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (discussing equivalence of state 
real property tax exemptions). See also, Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) 
(discussing equivalence of state sales tax exemptions); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) 
(discussing equivalence of state income tax deductions); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (discussing equivalence of “special” income tax 
reductions); discussion infra notes 225–81 and accompanying text. 
 20. Expenditure analysis refers to the Court’s treatment of a tax benefit as the same, in 
all relevant respects, as a direct government outlay of money. Tax expenditures are revenue 
losses attributable to provisions of tax laws that allow, for example, exclusion, exemption, or 
deduction from gross income or that provide credits, preferential tax rates, or deferral of tax 
liability. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) 
(2000); JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR 
FISCAL YEARS 2000–2004, at 2 (Comm. Print 1999). Under tax expenditure theory, tax bene-
fits and direct government expenditures are considered equivalent only if the tax benefit was 
enacted to implement social policy, as opposed to further delineating the appropriate tax base. 
See discussion infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 21. Neutrality analysis refers to the Court’s treatment of a tax benefit as something 
other than a direct outlay of money by the government. The principle of neutrality emanates 
from the Court’s First Amendment cases and provides that the government must remain neu-
tral towards religion, neither endorsing nor inhibiting religious activities. In Walz v. Tax 
Commission, the Court provides a good explanation of neutrality. 
The course of constitutional neutrality . . . cannot be an absolutely straight line; ri-
gidity could well defeat the basic purpose of [the First Amendment], which is to in-
sure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhib-
ited. The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has 
been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally estab-
lished religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly 
proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a be-
nevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship 
and without interference. 
Walz, 397 U.S. at 669. 
 22. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 407, 411 n.20 (1999) (“The Supreme Court has been reticent to adopt tax 
expenditure analysis as a basis for constitutional decision-making, despite repeated invitations. 
The Court has shown that it clearly understands the economic equivalence of tax subsidies and 
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Using tax-expenditure theory as a guide, this article argues that 
tax-exempt charities, because of their favored tax status, receive FFA 
and should comply with civil rights laws that cover recipients of gov-
ernment financial assistance. This article uses tax policy to extend so-
cial policy beyond current civil rights norms.23 Admittedly, many tax-
exempt charities are covered by these civil rights laws without regard 
to their tax-exempt charitable status because they are state actors or 
receive traditional forms of FFA,24 either directly (e.g., government 
grants) or indirectly (e.g., accepting students with government guar-
anteed student loans).25 However, other tax-exempt charities receive 
no financial aid from the federal government except for tax benefits 
stemming from their tax-exempt charitable status.26 Thus, unless 
courts and agencies view this tax-favored status as a form of FFA, 
civil rights laws that apply to recipients of FFA do not apply to these 
other charities.27 
 
direct subsidies.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to Di-
rect Expenditures?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380–81 (1998) (“The Court itself has equivo-
cated, equating tax benefits and direct spending in some constitutional cases but not in others 
without indicating a rationale for such a seemingly inconsistent approach.”). See also Texas 
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 43 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]n other contexts 
we have suggested that tax exemptions and subsidies are equivalent. We have not treated them 
as equivalent, however, in the Establishment Clause context.” (citations omitted)). 
 23. See Sugin, supra note 22, at 472–74 (indicating that tax policy should reflect “some 
conception of fairness and justice,” and, consequently, tax law should be a tool for achieving 
such ends “because it is powerful, its effects are widespread, and its medium is money, the root 
of so much social inequality”); Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Under-
mines Civil Rights Law, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1080 (2000) (contending that tax law 
should “permit civil rights plaintiffs either to deduct fully or to exclude from income the por-
tion of a recovery expended for attorney’s fees” so as to “preserve the purposes of . . . federal 
civil rights law”). 
 24. See discussion infra notes 49–64 and accompanying text. 
 25. For example, under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 
U.S.C. § 7701 (2000), many private grade schools that have tax-exempt status receive gov-
ernment grants for various educational initiatives. Also, many tax-exempt private colleges and 
universities accept students that receive government grants or loans. See, e.g., United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 564 (1996) (“The private women’s colleges [in Virginia] are 
treated . . . exactly as all other private schools are treated, which includes the provision of tui-
tion-assistance grants to Virginia residents.”). In a recent decision, the United States Supreme 
Court held that parochial schools that received indirect or direct government assistance under 
the statute did not violate the Establishment Clause. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 26. Thus, a scholarship fund organized as a tax-exempt charitable organization may re-
ceive the entirety of its direct funding from private donors and may receive no traditional forms 
of indirect funding. 
 27. See, e.g., Bachman v. American Soc’y of Clinical Pathologists, 577 F. Supp. 1257, 
1264 (D.N.J. 1983) (concluding that tax-exemption alone is not FFA for purposes of Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973). 
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Current law ostensibly imposes civil rights restrictions on tax-
exempt charities by prohibiting charities from violating “established 
public policy.”28 However, it is unclear when or whether violation of 
civil rights laws is equivalent to violation of “established public pol-
icy”29 or, conversely, whether compliance with civil rights laws is 
equivalent to compliance with such policy.30 Therefore, to expand 
civil rights protections and clarify when a charity violates generally 
accepted civil rights standards, the need exists to expressly extend 
coverage of these civil rights laws to tax-exempt charities. This article 
articulates one method of accomplishing this social justice goal31 of 
maximizing human liberty through law.32 
Part II of this article describes tax-exempt charities and demon-
strates how civil rights laws, as currently interpreted, are inadequate 
to restrict the actions and policies of private tax-exempt charities that 
do not receive traditional forms of FFA. Part III provides a brief out-
line of civil rights laws in this country and discusses selected provi-
 
 28. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (“A corollary to 
the public benefit principle is the requirement, long recognized in the law of trusts, that the 
purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate established public policy.” (emphasis 
added)); see also discussion infra notes 65–73 and accompanying text. 
 29. See discussion infra notes 81–100 and accompanying text. 
 30. See generally Brennen, supra note 3. 
 31. See supra note 14 for a definition of the term “social justice.” 
 32. Professor Linda Sugin also posits an approach that would increase civil rights restric-
tions imposed on charities. Under Professor Sugin’s approach, the Equal Protection Clause 
could be applied against the government for allowing tax deductions to charities that discrimi-
nate based on race. See Sugin, supra note 22, at 457–59 (indicating that “anti-subordination” 
and “pure protection” models for interpreting the Equal Protection Clause would eliminate 
intent requirement of current law, permitting tax expenditures to be treated as equivalent to 
direct expenditures for all relevant purposes). This article, however, does not attempt to alter 
Equal Protection or other constitutional interpretive methodology to the extent that the 
methodology requires proof of discriminatory intent. Eliminating the “intent” requirement of 
constitutional analysis is unnecessary for civil rights statutory applicability purposes because 
intent is not generally a required element of proof for these statutory purposes—at least where 
relief requested is injunctive or declaratory in nature and not compensatory. See discussion in-
fra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 This article will also not address the practical problem of who, other than authorized gov-
ernment agencies, would have standing to challenge the tax-exempt charitable status of an en-
tity relying, in part, on a claim that tax benefits are FFA. See Francis R. Hill & Barbara L. 
Kirschten, Operational Issues: Public Policy Requirement, in FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION 
OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 2.03[6][d] (1998) (“One reason that there is so little guid-
ance on the scope of the public policy requirement is that the current judicial interpretation of 
the standing requirement limits the number of cases that will be decided on their merits.”). See 
also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (denying standing to parents of black schoolchil-
dren who complained that the service was not adequately implementing the public policy re-
quirement). 
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sions of those laws that cover recipients of FFA. Part III also de-
scribes the traditional interpretations of the phrase FFA as used in 
the civil rights statutory context by courts and agencies. Part IV out-
lines the basics of tax expenditure theory by tracing the history of the 
issue of equivalence of tax benefits and direct expenditures in the 
Supreme Court, using as examples the Court’s religion clause cases.33 
In addition, Part IV reviews recent academic discussion about 
equivalency to show that tax benefits and direct government expen-
ditures, while not always constitutionally equivalent, are nonetheless 
economically equivalent.34 Finally, Part V explains why the analysis in 
this article is limited only to certain organizations that receive tax 
benefits—namely, tax-exempt charities. Relying on the equivalence 
concept of tax expenditure theory, this article concludes that courts 
and federal agencies should adopt the view that tax-exempt charities 
are recipients of FFA under Title VI, Title IX, and any other federal 
civil rights statute for which receipt of FFA triggers coverage. 
II. TAX-EXEMPT CHARITIES AND THE INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT 
CIVIL RIGHTS RESTRICTIONS 
This Part provides an overview of the relevant laws affecting tax-
exempt charities and explains how current law fails to adequately en-
sure that charities do not violate individual civil rights. 
A. Overview of Tax-Exempt Charities 
A tax-exempt charity is a trust, corporation, or unincorporated 
association that is both exempt from the requirement to pay federal 
income tax35 and permitted to receive tax-deductible contributions 
 
 33. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Texas 
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 34. See generally Zelinsky, supra note 22; Sugin, supra note 22. 
 35. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1 (2000) (imposing tax on taxable income of individuals, trusts, 
and estates); see id. § 11 (imposing tax on taxable income of corporations). Section 501(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code provides that certain described organizations are exempt from the 
requirement to pay the income tax: “(a) Exemption from taxation—An organization described 
in subsection (c) or (d) or section 401(a) shall be exempt from taxation under this subtitle 
unless such exemption is denied under section 502 or 503.” Id. § 501(a). Among these ex-
empt organizations are “charities,” which are described in section 501(c)(3) as entities or 
funds that are 
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for 
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international 
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision 
of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or 
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from the public.36 Tax-exempt charities have existed in this country 
for as long as the United States has had an income tax.37 To obtain 
tax-exempt charitable status today, an entity must be organized and 
operated for charitable purposes and must avoid certain proscribed 
acts.38 
In § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”), 
Congress identifies several tax-exempt charitable purposes, including: 
testing for public safety, fostering amateur sports competition, pre-
venting cruelty to children or animals, and advancing religion, sci-
ence, literature, or education.39 Entities serving other general public 
benefit purposes may also qualify for tax-exempt charitable status 
even if the entity does not serve one of those purposes specifically  
identified in § 501(c)(3).40 The Department of the Treasury (“Treas-
 
animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . , and which does 
not participate in, or intervene in . . . , any political campaign on behalf of (or in op-
position to) any candidate for public office. 
Id. § 501(c)(3). 
 36. The tax deductions for contributions are allowed pursuant to § 170 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which provides that “there shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable con-
tribution . . . payment of which is made within the taxable year.” Id. § 70(a)(1). The few ex-
ceptions where entities other than § 501(c)(3) charities are entitled to income tax exemption 
as well as the right to receive tax deductible contributions from the public are certain veterans 
organizations (§ 170(c)(3)), fraternal organizations (§ 170(c)(4)), and cemetery associations 
(§ 170(c)(5)). The one exception of when a charity is not entitled to receive tax deductible 
contributions from the public is organizations that “test[] for public safety.” These public 
safety testing organizations are not described in the deductibility provisions. See generally id.  
§ 170; BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 233 (7th ed. 1998) 
(describing tax status of public testing organizations). 
 37. See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 172 (exempting from tax “any 
corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scien-
tific, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any 
private stockholder or individual”). 
 38. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). The prohibited acts include “substantial lobbying,” 
political campaign activities, private benefit, and inurement transactions. See id. One scholar 
recently noted that the private inurement prohibition “embodies the primary distinction be-
tween taxable and tax-exempt entities” and “is of such significance that it underlies all but one 
of the emerging theoretical justifications for tax-exemption.” See Darryll K. Jones, The Scintilla 
of Individual Profit: In Search of Private Inurement and Excess Benefit, 19 VA. TAX REV. 575, 
576–77, 579 (2000). 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (2000). This regulation specifically provides 
the following: 
(2) Charitable defined. The term charitable is used in section 501(c)(3) in its gener-
ally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as limited by the sepa-
rate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall 
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(“Treasury”), as the federal agency authorized to enforce  
§ 501(c)(3),41 has indicated that these other general public benefit 
purposes might include protection of the environment,42 operation 
of a public interest law firm,43 or engaging in certain community de-
velopment activities.44 These general public benefit purposes are re-
lated to each other in that each stems from contemporary and his-
torical understandings of the term “charitable.”45 In Bob Jones 
University v. United States, the Supreme Court further expanded the 
requirements for tax-exempt charitable status by holding that a chari-
table entity may not violate “established public policy.”46 This public 
policy limitation, however, is not specifically set out in the Code.47 
Thus, the Treasury, subject to possible judicial review, must make 
the initial determination about whether a particular entity’s actions 
or policies violate “established public policy.”48 
 
within the broad outlines of charity as developed by judicial decisions. 
Id. 
 41. Section 7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides: 
Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any person other than 
an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary shall prescribe all 
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, including all rules and 
regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law in relation to in-
ternal revenue. 
I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000). 
 42. See Rev. Rul. 76–204, 1976–1 C.B. 152. 
 43. See Rev. Rul. 75–74, 1975–1 C.B. 152. 
 44. See Rev. Rul. 74–587, 1974–2 C.B. 162. 
 45. See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 599–
601 (1990) (discussing role of federal income tax on not-for-profit organizations); Henry B. 
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprises, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 883–84 (1980) (discussing 
applicability of charitable deductions). 
 46. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (“A corollary to 
the public benefit principle is the requirement, long recognized in the law of trusts, that the 
purpose of a charitable trust may not be illegal or violate established public policy.”) (emphasis 
added)). See also Brennen, supra note 3, for a general discussion of the problems and dangers 
of the Treasury’s public policy power. 
 47. See Lars G. Gustafsson, The Definition of “Charitable” for Federal Income Tax Pur-
poses: Defrocking the Old and Suggesting Some New Fundamental Assumptions, 33 HOUS. L. 
REV. 587, 590 (1996). 
 48. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 596–97 (“In the first instance, however, the re-
sponsibility for construing the Code falls to the IRS.”); Commissioner v. Portland Cement 
Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981); United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306–07 (1967) (stat-
ing that the Court must defer to administration’s implementing congressional mandate); Boske 
v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 469–70 (1900) (holding that the Treasury Secretary’s judgment 
should be upheld unless clearly inconsistent with law); I.R.C. § 7805(a) (stating that Treasury 
Secretary may prescribe rules for enforcement). Despite the 1983 judicial mandate in Bob Jones 
University that comporting with public policy is a prerequisite to obtaining charitable status, 
the IRS “has yet to clearly set forth a consistent definition and scope of what constitutes a fun-
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B. Current Civil Rights Restrictions Imposed on Charities 
The current civil rights restrictions imposed on private charities 
consist of (1) traditional civil rights laws—at least to the extent the 
charity triggers coverage under these laws—and (2) the public policy 
limitation, as outlined by the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University 
v. United States. 
1. Traditional civil rights laws: Constitutional and statutory 
limitations 
Traditional federal civil rights protections are contained in a 
framework of laws consisting of the Constitution, statutes, regula-
tions, executive actions, and court interpretation.49 These protections 
attempt to cover all those situations in which one expects govern-
mental assurance of fundamental fairness. However, none of these 
governmental protections applies across the board to all persons who 
might claim entitlement to them. For example, federal constitutional 
civil rights protections do not apply unless the civil rights violator is a 
state actor.50 Since charities are not necessarily state actors, they are 
not typically subject to the restrictions imposed by the Constitu-
tion.51 Thus, private charities that commit civil rights violations are 
 
damental public policy.” John W. Lee et al., Capitalizing And Depreciating Cyclical Aircraft 
Maintenance Costs: More Trouble Than It’s Worth?, 17 VA. TAX. REV. 161, 230–31 (1997). 
The failure to define what a fundamental public policy is has the effect of enabling the Treasury 
to retain significant discretion to determine what is and what is not qualified to receive tax-
exempt charitable status solely due to a public policy violation. 
 49. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 
20 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000); Equal Pay Act of 1963, commonly known as the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000); Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs of the 
Department of Agriculture—Effectuation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 7 C.F.R. 
§ 15.1 (2000); Housing and Urban Development, Compliance Procedures for Affirmative Fair 
Housing Marketing, 24 C.F.R. § 108.25 (2000); Exec. Order No. 13166, 65 Fed. Reg. 
50121 (Aug. 11, 2000) (Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited English Profi-
ciency); Exec. Order No. 13160, 65 Fed. Reg. 39775 (June 23, 2000) (Nondiscrimination on 
the Basis of Race, Sex, Color, National Origin, Disability, Religion, Age, Sexual Orientation, 
and Status as a Parent in Federally Conducted Education and Training Programs). 
 50. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (“It is state action of a par-
ticular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-
matter of the [Fourteenth] amendment.”); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 
937 (1982) (“Our cases have accordingly insisted that the conduct allegedly causing that dep-
rivation of a [constitutional] federal right be fairly attributable to the State”). See also SMOLLA, 
supra note 6, at § 1.02[3][b] (“The state action requirement remains a bedrock principle of 
American constitutional law.”); Sugin, supra note 22, at 430 (“One might argue that tax bene-
fits do not involve sufficient state action to trigger constitutional scrutiny.”). 
 51. State actors are not foreclosed from organizing as tax-exempt charities, in the sense 
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generally not subject to punishment or penalty for those violations 
unless the charity is covered by any number of federal statutes that 
impose civil rights restrictions on private, nonstate actors.52 
The fact that private actors are covered by civil rights statutes and 
not directly covered by constitutional provisions that protect civil 
rights does not mean that the restrictions imposed on private actors 
are somehow less onerous than those imposed by the Constitution. 
In fact, civil rights statutes often impose greater restrictions on pri-
vate actors than the Constitution would impose if the actor were a 
state actor. For example, certain civil rights statutes extend constitu-
tional-like protections to “forms of discrimination not covered in any 
meaningful way by the Constitution,”53 such as discrimination based 
on age or disability.54 Also, civil rights statutes often broaden the 
“substantive principles governing discrimination,”55 by allowing 
claims to be based upon disparate impact, rather than proof of dis-
 
that their income is statutorily exempt from the income tax and they are permitted to receive 
tax-deductible contributions from the public. Additionally, where private parties, including 
charities, exercise governmental power by executing a traditional public function, the Supreme 
Court might find that the private actor is indeed a state actor. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 
U.S. 461, reh’g denied, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953) (holding that a private party that managed elec-
tions for public office was state actor); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that a 
private company that operated a “company town” was state actor). Thus, it is possible that a 
particular tax-exempt charity (1) is not a private entity, but rather, a state actor or (2) is both a 
private party and a state actor. This article’s focus, however, is on tax-exempt charities as pri-
vate actors. 
 52. Among these federal statutory restrictions are 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (imposing constitu-
tional limitations on private actors acting “under color of state law”) and Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (prohibiting discrimination based on race or sex in 
“any program or activity receiving ‘FFA’”). Though state statutes may also impose civil rights 
restrictions on charities, many such statutes are often limited by federal constitutional law. See, 
e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (invalidating, on First Amendment 
grounds, application of state anti-discrimination law against Boy Scouts’ exclusion of scout 
leader solely because scout leader was admitted homosexual). Further, private employment 
agreements, such as those between a union and its employers or between individual employees 
and their employers, may waive the right to a judicial forum and provide for arbitration of 
statutory civil rights claims. See Ann C. Hodges, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in the Union-
ized Workplace: Is Bargaining with the Union Required?, 16:3 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
(forthcoming) (discussing whether unions are authorized by federal law to waive employee 
rights to litigate statutory civil rights claims in court). In some cases, a statutory claim may 
never be heard if it is confined to the collectively bargained arbitration procedure because the 
union effectively controls the arbitration process and has limited resources to arbitrate. See id. 
 53. See SMOLLA, supra note 6, at § 1.01[2]. 
 54. See, e.g., The Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401–20; The 
American With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213; The Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621. 
 55. See SMOLLA, supra note 6, at § 1.01[2]. 
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criminatory intent.56 Thus, civil rights statutes arguably provide 
greater protections against civil rights violations than the Constitu-
tion.57 
In addition to civil rights statutes often providing greater civil 
rights protections than the Constitution, these statutes permit pri-
vate actors to be more proactive in advancing social justice objectives 
through methods like affirmative action.58 For example, private em-
 
 56. See, e.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (providing 
remedies for discrimination based on race on showing of discriminatory impact); Guardians 
Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983) (indicating that five Justices of the 
Supreme Court interpret Title VI as not requiring proof of discriminatory intent, as is the case 
with Equal Protection Clause); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 
(providing remedies for employment discrimination on a showing of disparate impact); Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (concluding that Title VII outlaws employ-
ment “practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”). Compare McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (requiring proof of “discriminatory intent” for showing of Equal 
Protection violation by governmental actor) with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–48 
(1976) (Equal Protection Clause prohibits only intentional discrimination). The requirement 
of proof of discriminatory impact only, and not discriminatory intent, for civil rights statutory 
purposes is limited to situations in which the requested relief is declaratory or injunctive in na-
ture, not compensatory. See SMOLLA, supra note 6, at § 8.02[3]; Guardians Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 
584, 597–606 (White, J.) (concluding that “unless discriminatory intent is shown, declaratory 
and limited injunctive relief should be the only available private remedies for Title VI viola-
tions”). 
 57. Indeed, some justices of the Supreme Court take the view that Title VI “has inde-
pendent force, with language and emphasis in addition to that found in the Constitution.” See 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 416 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring, 
joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and Rehnquist, J.). 
 58. See, e.g., Honourable Mr. Justice Michel Bastarache, Does Affirmative Action Have a 
Future as an Instrument of Social Justice?, 29 OTTAWA L. REV. 497 (1977). Regarding affirma-
tive action as a type of social justice, Justice Bastarache states: 
[T]he “individual justice” approach to equality law. . . centres on the relationship 
between the state and the individual, and in particular, on the view that the state’s 
role in eliminating disadvantage is two-fold: the elimination of any use of a personal 
characteristic as a criterion for the conferral of a social benefit, where the personal 
characteristic is irrelevant to an individual’s entitlement; and the elimination of crite-
ria which, though facially neutral, reduce the ability of individuals with certain per-
sonal characteristics to obtain a social benefit. 
  The “individual justice” model does not attempt to root out prejudicial as-
sumptions; it ignores the fact that justice has distributive effects. This model is op-
posed to the “social justice” model, which has for its premise the view that discrimi-
nation against certain groups is so pervasive that real equality for the members of the 
group can never be achieved through simple identification and removal of discrimi-
natory barriers. Instead, systemic remedies conferring benefits on the group are re-
quired to remedy the lingering effects of past injustice against the group. Thus, the 
social justice model permits the allocation of social benefits to individuals on the ba-
sis of group membership, past discrimination having resulted in the deprivation of 
social benefits in precisely the same manner. 
Id. at 500. 
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ployers have long enjoyed greater freedom under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 196459 than government employers under the 
Constitution60 to engage in aggressive voluntary affirmative action 
programs aimed at recruiting, hiring, and promoting racial and gen-
der minorities.61 When properly structured, an employer’s voluntary 
affirmative action plan will not be invalidated under Title VII so long 
as the plan is consistent with Congress’s goal of eliminating discrimi-
nation against traditional minorities.62 However, if a government 
employer were to implement a similar voluntary affirmative action 
plan (such as one based on race) and that plan were evaluated under 
the Constitution, a court would more likely invalidate the plan as 
unconstitutional.63 Thus, civil rights statutes, though providing 
greater protections against civil rights violations than the Constitu-
tion, do not unnecessarily hinder private actors who want to achieve 
social justice through methods like voluntary affirmative action.64 
 
 59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
 60. See, e.g., Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV (providing that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws”). 
 61. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 640–42 (1987) (approv-
ing, for Title VII purposes, a government employer’s voluntary gender-based affirmative action 
plan for women); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200–08 (1979) (approving a 
private employer’s voluntary race-based affirmative action plan for blacks). 
 62. See United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 204. The court quoted Senator Humphrey in 
stating: 
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation’s concern over centuries of 
racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had “been excluded 
from the American dream for so long” constituted the first legislative prohibition of 
all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial 
segregation and hierarchy. 
Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6552 (1964) (statement by Sen. Humphrey)). 
 63. See, e.g., Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 n.6 (rejecting Justice Scalia’s claim “that the obli-
gations of a public employer under Title VII must be identical to its obligations under the 
Constitution” and instead concluding that “the statutory prohibition with which that employer 
must contend was not intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution”). This is not to say 
that race-based affirmative action plans instituted by government actors are necessarily uncon-
stitutional. Indeed, federal courts have clearly indicated that government may use race as a fac-
tor in its affirmative action efforts but that such use is subject to strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289 (1978) (holding that strict scrutiny 
will be applied to “a classification based on race”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 225–26 (1995) (holding strict scrutiny applies to racial classifications); Smith v. 
University of Wash., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that race may be used as a 
factor in university admissions decisions, subject to review under a strict scrutiny standard that 
complies with Powell’s opinion in Bakke); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 940 (5th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (“[T]here is now absolutely no doubt that courts 
are to employ strict scrutiny when evaluating all racial classifications.”). 
 64. The Supreme Court has also interpreted some civil rights statutes as permitting pri-
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2. Bob Jones University’s public policy limitation 
The public policy limitation provides that the Treasury may re-
voke or, where appropriate, deny tax-exempt charitable status of an 
organization that acts contrary to “established public policy.”65 This 
public policy limitation on charities came from the Treasury in a 
1970 News Release.66 The News Release indicated that the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”) could not “legally justify” granting charita-
ble status to private schools that racially discriminate, nor could it al-
low tax deductions for contributions to such schools.67 The Supreme 
Court later expressly approved this public policy limitation on chari-
table activities in Bob Jones University v. United States, where the 
Court upheld the revocation of a charity’s tax-exempt status because 
the charity discriminated against blacks.68 Even though Bob Jones 
University involved discrimination only against blacks, the IRS (the 
administrative arm of the Treasury) has posited that the Bob Jones 
University principle applies to any number of public policy matters 
besides racial discrimination.69 Included among these other public 
 
vate rights of action. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 635–38 
(1983) (concluding that private cause of action for relief exists under Title VI); Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 710–16 (1979) (concluding that private right of action 
exists under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972). 
 65. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586 (“[E]ntitlement to tax exemption depends on 
meeting certain common law standards of charity—namely, that an institution seeking 
tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy.” 
(emphasis added)); Brennen, supra note 3, at 391 n.2 (citing various revenue rulings and gen-
eral counsel memoranda applying public policy determinations to tax matters). 
 66. I.R.S. News Release (Jul. 10, 1970), reprinted in [1970] 7 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 
(CCH) § 6,790. 
 67. See id. The IRS later revised its policy on discrimination. Rev. Rul. 71–447 formal-
ized the revised policy: 
Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have long recognized that the 
statutory requirement of being “organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, . . . or educational purposes” was intended to express the basic common 
law concept [of charity]. . . . All charitable trusts, educational or otherwise, are sub-
ject to the requirement that the purpose of the trust may not be illegal or contrary 
to public policy. 
Rev. Rul. 71–447, 1971–2 C.B. 230, clarified in Rev. Proc. 72–54, 1972–2 C.B. 834, super-
seded by Rev. Proc. 75–50, 1975–2 C.B. 587. When the Treasury tried to revoke Revenue Rul-
ing 71–447 and to recognize exemption for discriminatory private schools, a federal court en-
joined it from doing so. See Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 837–38 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev’d 
on other grounds, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
 68. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586. 
 69. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89–10–001 (Nov. 30, 1988) (“Although applying on its face 
only to race discrimination in education, the [public policy power] extends . . . to any activity 
violating a clear public policy.”). Accord Hill and Kirschten, supra note 32, at ¶ 2.03[6][c] 
(“[T]he scope of the public policy doctrine remains unclear, in part because the question of 
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policy areas might be gender preference,70 sexual orientation,71 drug 
use,72 or other areas in which public policies are said to be sufficiently 
“established.” 73 
 
what public policies trigger the public policy requirement for purposes of the section 501(c)(3) 
remains undefined . . . .”). In determining whether an organization’s activities will be consid-
ered permissible under § 501(c)(3), (1) the purpose of the organization must be charitable; (2) 
the activities must not be illegal, contrary to a clearly defined and established public policy, or 
in conflict with express statutory restrictions; and (3) the activities must be in furtherance of 
the organization’s exempt purpose and reasonably related to the accomplishment of the pur-
pose. See Rev. Rul. 80–278, 1980–2 C.B. 175. Thus, even where an organization is in strict 
compliance with “the law,” the public policy power permits the Treasury to revoke or deny 
charitable status if the organization’s admittedly legal activity violates “established public pol-
icy.” See id. 
 70. For example, the recent decision involving the Virginia Military Institute could 
prompt the Treasury to question whether single gender schools—either all-male or all-
female—violate “established public policy” with respect to gender preferences. See United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 556–58 (1996) [hereinafter “VMI”] (holding that state’s 
policy of admitting only men to a state school violates equal protection); Christopher H. Pyle, 
Women’s Colleges: Is Segregation by Sex Still Justifiable After United States v. Virginia?, 77 B.U. 
L. REV. 209, 260–71 (1997) (discussing whether women’s colleges have sufficient grounds to 
exclude men after VMI); Zelinsky, supra note 22, at 383–87 (discussing implications of VMI 
for same-sex tax-exempt institutions); Sugin, supra note 22, at 453–54 (discussing the poten-
tial broad application of Bob Jones University and the public policy limitation and indicating 
that “VMI might be the crucial precedent for Smith and Wellesley . . . because it establishes 
that such support is contrary to public policy”). See Hill & Kirschten, supra note 32, at  
¶ 2.03[6][c] (“The case of discrimination based on gender is potentially instructive both be-
cause there are adverse judicial precedents of uncertain precedential value and because contem-
porary issues relating to what may or may not be gender-based discrimination have raised ex-
tremely difficult questions.”). 
 71. In a recent First Amendment free association case, the Supreme Court held that Boy 
Scouts of America, a tax-exempt charity, has the constitutional right to exclude gay persons 
from positions of leadership solely because of the person’s sexual orientation. See Boy Scouts of 
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Arlington County v. White, 528 S.E.2d 706, 713 (Va. 
2000) (Hassell, J., dissenting) (concluding that “common law marriages or ‘same-sex un-
ions’ . . . are not recognized in this Commonwealth and are violative of the public policy of 
this Commonwealth”). 
 72. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Edited Transcript of the January 21, 2000 ABA 
Tax Section Exempt Organizations Committee Meeting, EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. April 2000, at 
59 (questioning how the IRS should respond in situations where state or local law makes 
something legal, like distributing needles to reduce the transmission of HIV among drug users 
or distributing marijuana for medicinal purposes, but there is arguably a federal policy or law 
against it). The United States Supreme Court is expected to decide a case this term that ad-
dresses the issue of the legality of a state law that permits distribution of marijuana for medici-
nal purposes while a federal law prohibits such distribution. See United States v. Oakland Can-
nabis Buyers’ Coop., 221 F.3d 1349 (9th Cir. 2000) (reported in full at 2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9963 (9th Cir. Cal. May 10, 2000)), cert. granted, United States v. Cannabis, 2000 
U.S. LEXIS 7699 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2000) (involving an action brought by United States to en-
join Cannabis clubs from distributing marijuana as violations of Controlled Substance Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 841). 
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C. Inadequacies of Current Civil Rights Restrictions 
Current civil rights restrictions imposed on private charities—
because of gaps in coverage, lack of Congressional authority, and un-
clear limitations on authority—are inadequate to ensure that charities 
will be penalized if they violate civil rights protected by federal stat-
utes.74 These restrictions might also be used to hinder attempts to 
advance social justice through methods like affirmative action, thus 
undermining civil rights advancement.75 
1. Inadequacies of traditional civil rights laws 
Traditional civil rights laws, as currently interpreted, are inade-
quate to ensure against civil rights violations by private charities be-
cause they contain significant gaps in coverage.76 For example, Bob 
Jones University came before the Supreme Court because none of the 
traditional civil rights laws existing at that time covered Bob Jones 
University’s discriminatory behavior.77 Although, from a public pol-
icy perspective, most agreed that Bob Jones University’s discrimina-
tion against blacks was reprehensible, the government was powerless 
to use its traditional civil rights arsenal against a private, nonstate ac-
tor.78 As explained previously, this traditional civil rights arsenal con-
 
 73. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATION CPE TECHNICAL 
INSTRUCTION PROGRAM TEXTBOOK ch. L, § 4.b. (1994) [hereinafter “IRS EXEMPT OR-
GANIZATION TEXTBOOK”] (“Just as the Service responded to public outrage over racial 
discrimination in education in Bob Jones and to possible kickbacks in GCM 39862, the Service 
can be expected to re-evaluate positions in other areas as the public policy considerations be-
come more clearly focused because of Congressional action, decisions of the Executive Branch, 
or court actions.”); Hill and Kirschten, supra note 32, at ¶ 2.03[6][c] (“In practical terms, 
gender, disability, or sexual orientation may well provide the basis of a fundamental public pol-
icy that defines the limit of qualification for exemption.”). See also National Office Technical 
Advice Memorandum from the IRS to the Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop Es-
tate (Feb. 4, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter “Bishop Estate TAM”] (discussing appli-
cation of public policy power with respect to a tax-exempt Hawaiian school that excluded Cau-
casians and other non-Hawaiians from admission consideration). 
 74. See generally Brennen, supra note 3, at 394 n.159 (describing application of civil 
rights laws in private sector context). 
 75. See id. 
 76. But see Pyle, supra note 70, at 215–16 (suggesting that no gap in coverage exists 
because courts, for example, “may . . . find that tax exemptions to private women’s colleges for 
non-compensatory purposes” constitute FFA for statutory civil rights purposes). 
 77. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 574. 
 78. Even today, Bob Jones University continues to discriminate against blacks. See, e.g., 
Bob Jones Univ. Museum and Gallery, Inc. v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3120 (1996) 
(issuing declaratory judgment that museum, affiliated with non-exempt Bob Jones University, 
is entitled to be exempt from Federal income taxation under § 501(a) as an organization meet-
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sists of constitutional limitations (which do not generally apply to 
charities) and statutory limitations (which do not apply to particular 
charities).79 Thus, Bob Jones University’s discrimination against 
blacks in the 1970s presented the Treasury and the Court with a 
situation that, short of congressional action, appeared unsolvable 
unless the Treasury resorted to use of the public policy power.80 
2. Inadequacies of the public policy limitations 
The Supreme Court’s response to the inadequacy of traditional 
civil rights laws was to recognize in Treasury a public policy power: 
the power to make tax law decisions based on the Treasury’s own as-
sessment of the existence and the clarity of a particular public pol-
icy.81 However, the Treasury’s public policy power is also an inade-
quate tool for advancing social justice because it lacks sufficient legal 
authority and a clearly defined scope of applicability.82 
Unfortunately, Congress has not clearly authorized Treasury to 
make important non-tax public policy decisions with respect to civil 
rights enforcement.83 No currently existing federal statute explicitly 
 
ing the requirements of § 501(c)(3)). However, in order to maintain § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
status for its museum, Bob Jones University allows all, regardless of race, to view its affiliated 
museum displays. See id. (“The museum is open to the public free of charge.”). 
 79. See discussion supra notes 49–64 and accompanying text. 
 80. At least one commentator suggests that the IRS’s knowing grant of tax-exempt 
charitable status to organizations that discriminate based on race, like Bob Jones University, 
might violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Sugin, supra note 22, at 452–53 (asserting that 
application of § 501(c)(3) “to authorize exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools, 
such as Bob Jones University, could potentially violate equal protection” because of the view 
that “the government actively approves of a private party’s discrimination by affirmatively 
granting a discriminating party an exemption and placing that organization on the official and 
public list of approved organizations”). 
 81. See Brennen, supra note 3, at 394 (discussing implied statutory authority of Treas-
ury to regulate public policy). 
 82. See id.; FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). In 
Brown & Williamson, Justice O’Connor, for the majority, writes: 
Nonetheless, no matter how “important, conspicuous, and controversial” the issue, 
and regardless of how likely the public is to hold the Executive Branch politically ac-
countable, an administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public interest must 
always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress. And “in our anxiety 
to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the public, we must take care 
not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where Congress indicated it 
would stop.” 
Id. at 1315 (quoting United States v. An Article of Drug, 394 U.S. 784, 800 (1969)). 
 83. See Brennen, supra note 3, at 416 (explaining that Congress has not expressly au-
thorized Treasury to regulate public policy on non-tax matters). In the more than 30 years 
since the Treasury’s adoption of the public policy power in 1970, Congress has enacted no law 
that would codify the Bob Jones University result. But see Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 601 
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provides that Treasury has the legal authority to act solely on public 
policy grounds.84 In the absence of express congressional authority, 
the Court in Bob Jones University was compelled to rely upon its in-
terpretation of the term “charitable” as used in § 501(c)(3) of the 
Code as its basis for recognizing Treasury’s public policy power.85 In 
doing so, the Court referred to the legislative history of § 501(c)(3) 
and English charitable trust law.86 The problem with relying on legis-
lative history to support the Treasury’s definition of “charitable” was 
that, several years prior, Congress had considered and refused to 
adopt that very definition.87 In a recent decision, the Supreme Court 
 
(stating that “Congress affirmatively manifested its acquiescence in the IRS policy when it en-
acted the present § 501(i) of the Code, Act of October 20, 1976, Pub. L. 94–568, 90 Stat. 
2697 (1976)”). Section 501(i), which prohibits discrimination by social clubs only, provides, 
in part: 
[A social club] shall not be exempt from taxation under [§ 501(a)] for any taxable 
year if, at any time during such taxable year, the charter, bylaws, or other governing 
instrument, of such organization or any written policy statement of such organiza-
tion contains a provision which provides for discrimination against any person on 
the basis of race, color, or religion. 
I.R.C. § 501(i) (2000). However, social clubs, exempt via § 501(c)(7) of the Code, are not 
charities. Rather, they are “organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable pur-
poses, substantially all of the activities of which are for such purposes and no part of the net 
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder.” Id. § 501(c)(7). Section 
501(i)’s prohibition does not apply to charities, which are exempt via § 501(c)(3) of the Code. 
 84. In his dissent in Bob Jones University, Justice Rehnquist notes that “it seems to me 
that in § 501(i) Congress showed that when it wants to add a requirement prohibiting racial 
discrimination to one of the tax-benefit provisions, it is fully aware of how to do it.” Bob Jones 
Univ., 461 U.S. at 621 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. at 588–89. 
 87. Before Treasury first acted pursuant to its public policy power in 1970, see IRS News 
Release, supra note 66, Congress considered and rejected a proposal to amend the Code to 
provide the Treasury with clear statutory authority to deny charitable status to organizations 
that discriminate based on race. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 90 n.143 (1988) (citing H.R. 6342, 89th Cong. (1965), reprinted in 
111 CONG. REC. 5140 (1965)). In 1965, Congress attempted to pass a bill that would amend 
the Code “to provide that an organization described in section 501(c)(3) . . . which engages in 
certain discriminatory practices shall be denied an exemption.” Id. This bill failed to become 
law. See A Bill to Amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to Provide that an Organization 
Described in Section 501(c)(3) of Such Code Which Engages in Certain Discriminatory Practices 
Shall be Denied an Exemption, H.R. 6342, 89th Cong. (1965), reprinted in 111 CONG. REC. 
5140 (1965). (A search of the Congressional Index and the Congressional Record do not re-
flect that the bill ever emerged out of the House Ways and Means Committee.) Congress’s 
consideration and outright rejection of this amendment to § 501(c)(3) indicates Congress’s 
“acquiescence in exactly the opposite interpretation” than that posited by the Court in Bob 
Jones University, thus raising concerns regarding the legal legitimacy of the public policy 
power. See Eskridge, supra note 87, at 90–91; Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Race, Re-
ligion & Public Policy: Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (stating 
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held that an agency does not ordinarily have regulatory authority 
with respect to a matter when Congress considered and rejected leg-
islation that would expressly grant such authority.88 Given that Con-
gress considered and rejected legislation that would implement a nar-
row version of the public policy power, one can infer that Congress 
would have also rejected the broad version of the power as under-
stood by the Treasury.89 Thus, Treasury’s public policy power lacks 
firm legal grounding.90 
 
that hearings were never held on the bill because it had so little support in Congress). 
 88. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). In Brown 
& Williamson, Justice O’Connor describes how Congress’ consideration and rejection of sev-
eral legislative proposals to grant FDA authority to regulate tobacco indicate that FDA lacked 
such regulatory authority: 
[C]ongress considered and rejected several proposals to give the FDA the authority 
to regulate tobacco. In April 1963, Representative Udall introduced a bill “to 
amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act so as to make that Act applicable 
to smoking products.” . . . In December 1963, Representative Rhodes introduced 
another bill that would have amended the FDCA “by striking out ‘food, drug, de-
vice, or cosmetic’ each place where it appears therein and inserting in lieu thereof 
‘food, drug, device, cosmetic, or smoking product.’” And in January 1965, . . . Rep-
resentative Udall again introduced a bill to amend the FDCA “to make that Act ap-
plicable to smoking products.” None of these proposals became law. 
  Congress ultimately decided in 1965 to subject tobacco products to the less 
extensive regulatory scheme of the FCLAA, which created a “comprehensive Federal 
program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relation-
ship between smoking and health.” The FCLAA rejected any regulation of advertis-
ing, but it required the warning, “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous 
to Your Health,” to appear on all cigarette packages. In the Act’s “Declaration of 
Policy,” Congress stated that its objective was to balance the goals of ensuring that 
“the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazardous to 
health” and protecting “commerce and the national economy . . . to the maximum 
extent.” 
Id. at 147–48 (citations omitted). 
 89. In describing the legislation considered and rejected by Congress as “a narrow ver-
sion of the public policy power,” the intent is to convey the message that the legislation did 
not attempt to grant Treasury a broad public policy power relating to any number of racial and 
non-racial matters. 
 90. The problem with the Court’s use of English charitable trust law is that English 
trust law provides, at best, only tangential support for Treasury’s tax law definition of “charita-
ble.” See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 588–89. The only textual reference to an English law 
basis is a statement of Lord McNaughten that “charity” in its legal sense comprises four princi-
pal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for 
the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not 
falling under any of the preceding. See id. at 589 (citing Commissioners v. Pemsel, [1891] 
App. Cas. 531, 583). Further, the Court in Bob Jones University cited no statement in the 
Congressional reports. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586–88 & n.12 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 
91–413, at 35, 43 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1680), and little floor de-
bate, see id. at 590 (citing 55 CONG. REC. 6728 (1917) (statement of Sen. Hollis)), on  
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The public policy power is also an inadequate tool for civil rights 
enforcement because the Court in Bob Jones University failed to de-
fine the scope of applicability of this power.91 That is, the Court did 
not address the limits of the Treasury’s power to determine when or 
if a particular public policy is sufficiently “established” in any context 
other than whites discriminating against blacks. For example, the 
Court did not discuss the acceptability of race-based affirmative ac-
tion programs or single gender private schools as consistent or in-
consistent with “established public policy.”92 With respect to race-
based affirmative action programs, who is to say whether the Treas-
ury might view these programs as contrary to established public poli-
cies affecting race because they involve racial preferences, albeit for 
blacks and others historically oppressed by American segregation 
laws? 
 
§ 501(c)(3) mentioning the public policy requirement. See also Robert M. Cover, The Supreme 
Court, 1982 Term: Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 63–64 (1983) (“Nei-
ther the text of the Code nor the legislative history before the IRS’s 1970 ruling seemed to 
compel [the Court’s] interpretation.”). Scholars and courts likewise question the use of trust 
law concepts in tax settings. See, e.g., Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints on Charitable 
Organizations, 3 VA. TAX REV. 291, 292 (1984) (concluding that “trust law does not provide 
the theoretical foundation for public policy constraints in the area of federal tax law”); 
Gustafsson, supra note 47, at 647 (arguing that the charitable trust law definition of “charita-
ble” should not have been adopted for federal income tax exemption and deductibility of con-
tribution purposes); Brennen, supra note 3, at 446 (asserting that Congress has passed no law 
affirmatively stating that Treasury shall, pursuant to its own determinations of “established 
public policy,” grant or deny tax-exempt charitable status to organizations that discriminate 
based on race); International Reform Fed’n v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 131 
F.2d 337, 342–46 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Miller, J., dissenting) (“There is no necessary identity 
between the indicia of a charitable trust and those of a charitable purpose which will exempt an 
agency from taxation.”); Schuster v. Nichols, 20 F.2d 179, 181 (D. Mass. 1927) (concluding 
that term “charitable” signifies corporations organized and operated solely for “eleemosynary 
purposes”). Thus, the Court in Bob Jones University incorrectly extended the English trust law 
definition of “charitable” to United States income tax law. Cf. Merkel v. Commissioner, 132 
F.3d 844, 850–51 (9th Cir. 1999) (declaring that the Ninth Circuit refused to define “liabil-
ity” for tax law purposes in same way that term is defined for bankruptcy law purposes). 
 91. See Brennen, supra note 3, at 403 (describing analysis used by United States Su-
preme Court to conclude that Treasury has authority to determine the public purpose of a 
charity); Hill & Kirschten, supra note 32, at ¶ 2.03[6][c] (“In the absence of specific guidance 
. . . it is neither possible nor prudent to state with certainty what ‘clear public policies’ other 
than racial discrimination might lead to nonrecognition or revocation of exempt status.”). 
 92. See Bob Jones University, 461 U.S. at 591. The Treasury has indicated that other 
matters besides discrimination against blacks are areas contemplated by the public policy 
power. See IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATION TEXTBOOK, supra note 73 (“Just as the Service re-
sponded to public outrage over racial discrimination in education in Bob Jones and to possible 
kickbacks in GCM 39862, the Service can be expected to re-evaluate positions in other areas as 
the public policy considerations become more clearly focused because of Congressional action, 
decisions of the Executive Branch, or court actions.”). 
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For constitutional law purposes, the Court applies one standard 
of review when evaluating race preference policies—whether it is ex-
amining discrimination against blacks or so-called benign discrimina-
tion against whites.93 The Treasury, through the IRS, has indicated a 
willingness to follow this constitutional law precedent in making its 
public policy decisions. For example, in a recent agency decision, the 
IRS hinted that, in its view, preferences for Hawaiians that disadvan-
tage whites might violate “established public policy”94 just as gov-
ernment preferences for blacks and Hispanic Americans necessarily 
violate constitutional law in some judicial circuits.95 
On a related matter, in Rice v. Cayetano,96 the Court recently de-
cided that the state of Hawaii could not constitutionally prefer Ha-
waiians to whites and other non-Hawaiians in determining the right 
to vote for trustees of a state fund benefiting native Hawaiians.97 
Should this constitutional law decision with respect to government 
actors dictate the Treasury’s public policy decisions with respect to 
private nongovernmental actors? While the IRS appears to think so,98 
it remains to be seen how the IRS and the Treasury will actually re-
 
 93. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 295 (1978) (“It is far 
too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition 
of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others.”). See also 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 225–26 (1995) (holding strict scrutiny 
applies to “benign” and non-benign racial classifications); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 
940 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (“[T]here is now absolutely no 
doubt that courts are to employ strict scrutiny when evaluating all racial classifications, includ-
ing those characterized by their proponents as ‘benign’ or ‘remedial.’”). 
 94. See Bishop Estate TAM, supra note 73. In the Bishop Estate TAM, the IRS advised 
the Bishop Estate, a tax-exempt trust, that its policy of only admitting Hawaiian children to 
the trust’s school is consistent with established public policy. Id. However, the IRS continued 
that the Bishop Estate “should consider requesting a private letter ruling on whether the [Su-
preme Court’s] decision [in Rice v. Cayetano] has any effect on the [Service’s] analysis.” Id.; 
see also Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for Bishop Estate: What is the I.R.S. Role in Charity Gov-
ernance?, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 537, 542 n.27 (1999). 
 95. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962 (concluding that, in the Fifth Circuit, government can 
never use race as a factor when making decisions about public law school admissions), cert. de-
nied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996); Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 161–62 (4th Cir. 1994), 
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995) (concluding that a race-exclusive scholarship program at 
University of Maryland violated Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). 
 96. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See Bishop Estate TAM, supra note 73. But see Brennen, supra note 3, at 435 n.236 
(noting generally that evaluation of constitutional law standards is not synonymous with 
evaluation of public policy standards); Hill & Kirschten, supra note 32, at ¶ 2.03[6][c] (ex-
plaining that Service’s reliance on Constitutional law standards when making public policy de-
cisions is “flaw[ed]”). 
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spond as it evaluates race-conscious programs involving preferences 
for Hawaiians in light of the Court’s decision in Rice.99 
In sum, the public policy power outlined by the Court in Bob 
Jones University is inadequate as a tool for broad civil rights enforce-
ment because that power lacks sufficient legislative authority and its 
scope is unclear. Although the Court cautiously stated that violation 
of a given public policy must be “established,” it set no clear 
boundaries for the Treasury to determine when a policy other than 
discrimination against blacks is sufficiently established.100 Conceiva-
bly, in this era of affirmative action retrenchment, Treasury might in-
terpret a private charity’s affirmative efforts to achieve social justice as 
violating “established public policy” against redressing the effects of 
pervasive societal discrimination through use of race-conscious poli-
cies. 
III. FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE UNDER FEDERAL CIVIL 
RIGHTS STATUTES 
As discussed in Part II, current civil rights restrictions imposed 
on private tax-exempt charities are inadequate for a number of rea-
sons. These restrictions do not cover all charities and vest too much 
discretionary power in the Treasury to make initial determinations 
about denial or revocation of tax-exempt status. The legislative and 
judicial decisions in this area are a slender reed upon which to rely 
for civil rights protection. For example, recent Supreme Court deci-
sions make it likely that the Court’s decision in Bob Jones University 
will be insufficient to advance or protect important and desirable so-
cial justice goals.101 One possible solution to the inadequacies of the 
current civil rights restrictions imposed on charities is to develop an 
interpretive framework that takes advantage of existing civil rights 
laws that apply to private actors generally. Specifically, if courts and 
agencies viewed tax-exempt charities as recipients of FFA for pur-
poses of civil rights statutes that cover such recipients, all charities 
 
 99. To date, the IRS has not issued a follow-up TAM or other letter ruling to the  
Bishop Estate on the matter of the Bishop Estate’s school’s policy of limiting admissions to 
Hawaiian children. 
 100. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983). The Court stated: 
We are bound to approach these questions with full awareness that determinations 
of public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters with serious implications for 
the institutions affected; a declaration that a given institution is not “charitable” 
should be made only where there can be no doubt that the activity involved is con-
trary to a fundamental public policy. 
Id. 
 101. See discussion supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
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would be subject to civil rights restrictions in a more uniform, pre-
dictable, and just manner. 
A. Civil Rights Statutes that Cover Recipients of FFA 
Congress has enacted many statutes to protect citizens’ civil 
rights.102 However, this article will only examine those civil rights 
laws that apply to private actors who receive FFA.103 Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964104 and Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments Act of 1972105 are the principal laws that forbid discrimination 
based on race and sex, respectively, by private actors that receive 
FFA.106 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Age Discrimination 
Act also impose civil rights restrictions based on a private actor’s re-
ceipt of FFA.107 This subpart will describe each of these laws in turn. 
1. Discrimination based on race, color, or national origin 
Title VI, first enacted in 1964,108 provides that: “No person in 
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national ori-
gin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance.”109 Title VI’s prohibitions against ex-
clusion, denial, or discrimination came from Congress’s powers un-
der the Spending Clause to set conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds110 and from the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.111 
Under Title VI, federal agencies “empowered to extend Federal Fi-
nancial assistance” through “grant[s] loan[s] or contract[s]” to a pri-
vate actor for “any program or activity” are required to enforce the 
 
 102. See, e.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000); Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U.S.C. 794(a) (2000); Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (2000); Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000); Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000–e 
(2000). 
 103. See, e.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000); Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000); Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000); Age Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (2000). 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
 105. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–86. 
 106. See SMOLLA, supra note 6, § 8.01. 
 107. 29 U.S.C. § 794; 42 U.S.C. § 6102. 
 108. See Act of July 2, 1985, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 252. 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
 110. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 111. See SMOLLA, supra note 6, § 8.02[1]. 
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provisions of Title VI.112 In its enforcement role, the federal agency 
is authorized to seek voluntary compliance with the operative anti-
discrimination provisions of Title VI and, failing voluntary compli-
ance, to threaten to terminate the violator’s federal financial fund-
ing.113 
2. Gender discrimination in education 
Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 provides: 
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be ex-
cluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any education program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance.”114 Though narrower in scope 
than Title VI,115 Title IX relies on the exact same jurisdictional basis 
as Title VI; that is, Title IX only applies if the alleged civil rights vio-
lator acts within the context of a program or activity “receiving Fed-
eral financial assistance.”116 Thus, it is the meaning of this jurisdic-
tional phrase that is the focus of this article’s thesis. 
3. Discrimination based on a disability 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 also imposes civil rights restric-
tions on private entities that receive FFA.117 The Rehabilitation Act, 
which prohibits discrimination based on disability, provides: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United 
States, as defined in section 7(20) [29 U.S.C. § 706(20)], shall, 
solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any program or activity receiving Federal financial as-
sistance . . . .118 
 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1. 
 113. See Caufield v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
1030 (1981). 
 114. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 115. While Title VI applies to “any program or activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). 
Title IX only applies to “any education program or activity.” Id. § 1681(a) (emphasis added). 
 116. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
 117. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). 
 118. Id. § 794(a). 
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4. Discrimination based on age 
The Age Discrimination Act prohibits discrimination based on 
age by private entities that receive FFA. The relevant portion of the 
Age Discrimination Act provides: 
Pursuant to regulations prescribed under [42 U.S.C. § 6103], and 
except as provided by [42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)] and [42 U.S.C. § 
6103(c)], no person in the United States shall, on the basis of age, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance.119 
B. Traditional Interpretations of the Phrase FFA 
Courts have not uniformly interpreted the phrase FFA for federal 
civil rights statutory purposes to include federal tax benefits. While 
some federal district and circuit courts addressing the issue have con-
cluded (either in dicta or otherwise) that tax exemptions, credits, and 
deductions may be treated as FFA,120 other courts have concluded 
otherwise.121 For example, Title VI defines FFA as “assistance to any 
program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a 
contract of insurance or guaranty.”122 The typical regulation issued 
by federal agencies pursuant to Title VI provides: 
 
 
 119. 42 U.S.C. § 6102. 
 120. See, e.g., M.H.D. v. Westminster Schools, 172 F.3d 797, 802 n.12 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(rejecting jurisdiction of the case because the statute of limitations lapsed and concluding that 
the claim that tax-exemption is FFA is neither immaterial nor wholly frivolous); Glantz v. 
Automotive Service Ass’n of Pa., Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18299 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (hold-
ing that plaintiff’s claim that private receipt of federal tax credits constitutes federal assistance 
under Title VI was dismissed because plaintiff did not allege that plaintiff was the intended 
beneficiary of the federal assistance); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 
F.2d 694, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that while investment tax credits available to railroad 
and airline industries under § 46(a)(8) do not amount to assistance that triggers coverage by 
section 504, the McGlotten “fundamental” principle that tax benefits may constitute FFA is 
sound); National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868, 876 n. 14 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating 
that McGlotten and other like decisions “call into question whether an organization enjoying 
an educational tax exemption under federal law may deny membership on the basis of race”). 
 121.  See, e.g., Martin v. Delaware Law Sch. of Widener Univ., 625 F. Supp. 1288, 1302 
n.13 (D. Del. 1985) (stating, under Rehabilitation Act, that “‘assistance’ connotes transfer of 
government funds by way of subsidy, not merely exemption from taxation”), aff’d, 884 F.2d 
1384 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966 (1989); Stewart v. New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 
1305, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding tax benefits insufficient to create FFA under Title VI). 
 122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–1. 
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[The term] “federal financial assistance” includes (1) grants and 
loans of Federal funds, (2) the grant or donation of Federal prop-
erty . . . , (3) the detail of Federal personnel, (4) the sale and lease 
of, and the permission to use . . . Federal property . . . without con-
sideration or at a nominal consideration, . . . and (5) any Federal  
agreement . . . which has as one of its purposes the provision of as-
sistance.123 
However, these regulations do not specifically state whether FFA in-
cludes federal tax benefits. Instead, courts have provided guidance in 
this regard. 
Grove City College v. Bell is the seminal case in which the Su-
preme Court generally outlined its interpretation of FFA for civil 
rights statutory purposes, doing so in the context of defining what a 
“program or activity” is under Title IX.124 In Grove City College, 
however, the Court did not extend its analysis to specifically consider 
tax benefits as a form of FFA. 
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of tax 
benefits as FFA, several lower courts have. Two significant reported 
lower court cases involving whether FFA includes tax benefits are 
McGlotten v. Connally 125 and Bachman v. American Society of Clini-
cal Pathologists.126 McGlotten and Bachman were decided prior to 
Grove City College and involved interpretation of FFA as used in Title 
VI and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
This subpart will, first, outline the general interpretation of FFA 
as articulated by the Supreme Court in Grove City College v. Bell.127 
Second, this subpart will discuss those lower court decisions that ad-
dress the specific issue of whether tax benefits are a form of FFA for 
civil rights statutory purposes.128 This subpart will conclude by com-
paring and contrasting these court decisions to discern the correct 
 
 123. 7 C.F.R. § 15.2 (2001) (Department of Agriculture); see also 28 C.F.R. § 42.101 
(Department of Justice); 45 C.F.R. § 80.13 (2001) (Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare). 
 124. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). 
 125. 338 F. Supp. 448, 462 (D.D.C. 1972) (concluding that, while provision of tax ex-
emption for 501(c)(7) social clubs does not come within scope of Title VI, provision of tax 
exemption for 501(c)(8) fraternal organizations and provision of tax deductions for 170(c) 
charitable contributions are grants of FFA within scope of Title VI). 
 126. 577 F. Supp 1257, 1265 (D.N.J. 1983) (concluding that tax exemption alone is not 
FFA rendering organization as whole subject to Title VI). 
 127. See discussion infra notes 130–56 and accompanying text. 
 128. See discussion infra notes 160–87, 192–99 and accompanying text. 
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analytical approach that should be used when questioning whether 
FFA includes tax benefits.129 
1. FFA generally 
Grove City College involved the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of “receiving ‘FFA’” as used in Title IX of the Education Act 
Amendments of 1972.130 Grove City was a private college that re-
fused to accept state and federal financial support so that it could 
avoid government oversight and maintain its institutional auton-
omy.131 Accordingly, Grove City refused to participate in government 
aid programs under which the government made payments directly 
to the college or indirectly to the college through student aid pro-
grams involving government loans, work study, or most government 
grants.132 However, Grove City did accept students who received 
federal Better Education Opportunity Grants (“BEOG”).133 BEOGs 
required very little involvement by Grove City because the United 
States Department of Education performed most administrative tasks 
relating to the grants, such as calculating the amount awarded to 
each student and paying that amount directly to the student (who 
then paid the amount over to Grove City as tuition). 
Grove City’s only involvement in the BEOG grant program, 
other than being a recipient of the grant money as tuition, was the 
making of required certifications to appropriate federal agencies.134 
 
 129. See discussion infra notes 200–04 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 557. The pertinent portion of Title IX provided: 
“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” Id. at n.1 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)). 
Title IX also directs agencies awarding most types of assistance to promulgate regulations to 
ensure that recipients adhere to that prohibition. Compliance with departmental regulations 
may be secured by termination of assistance “to the particular program, or part thereof, in 
which . . . noncompliance has been . . . found” or by “any other means authorized by law.” Id. 
at 557–58 n.2 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1682). 
 131. See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 559. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. BEOGs were authorized by 20 U.S.C. § 1070a (1982). 
 134. The Department of Education established an Alternative Disbursement System for 
schools like Grove City that wanted little to do with the administration of BEOGs. Under the 
Regular Disbursement System, in which most schools participated, the Department estimated 
the amount a school needed for grants and advanced that amount to the school, which then 
selected students, calculated awards, and distributed the grants to students. 34 C.F.R.  
§§ 690.71–.85 (1983). Under the Alternative Disbursement System, participating schools 
make appropriate certifications to the Department, but the Department calculates awards and 
makes disbursements directly to students. Id. §§ 690.91–.96. 
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Among these required certifications was that Grove City sign an As-
surance of Compliance agreeing to comply with Title IX’s prohibi-
tion (which applied to all recipients of FFA) against discrimination 
based on sex. The Department of Education defined FFA to include:  
A grant or loan of Federal financial assistance, including funds 
made available for: . . . (ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or 
other funds extended to any entity for payment to or on behalf of 
students admitted to that entity, or extended directly to such stu-
dents for payment to that entity.135  
The Department of Education defined “recipient” of FFA to in-
clude: “[Any] public or private agency, institution, or organization, 
or other entity, or any person, to whom Federal financial assistance is 
extended directly or through another recipient and which operates 
an education program or activity which receives or benefits from 
such assistance.”136 
Claiming that it was not a recipient of FFA under these rules, 
and therefore not required to comply with Title IX, Grove City re-
fused to sign the Assurance of Compliance. Accordingly, the De-
partment of Education, pursuant to its enforcement and regulatory 
authority with respect to Title IX, refused to award BEOG’s to stu-
dents attending Grove City.137 Grove City and several of its students 
sued the agency in federal court and won on technical grounds at the 
district court level138 but eventually lost on appeal to the Third Cir-
 
 135. Id. § 106.2(g)(1). 
 136. Id. § 106.2(h). 
 137. Section 902 of 20 U.S.C. § 1682 provides in part: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal finan-
cial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or con-
tract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to ef-
fectuate the provisions of section [901] with respect to such program or activity by 
issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent 
with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance 
in connection with which the action is taken. . . . Compliance with any requirement 
adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal 
to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipi-
ent . . . or (2) by any other means authorized by law . . . . 
20 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000). 
 138. Grove City College v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (1980). The District Court held 
that BEOGs were “[contracts] of insurance or guaranty” that could not be terminated under 
Title IX; that Grove City could not be required to execute an Assurance of Compliance be-
cause either Subpart E of the Title IX regulations, which prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment, was invalid or Title IX permitted termination only upon an actual finding of sex dis-
crimination, not a mere refusal to execute an Assurance; and that affected students were 
entitled to hearings before their aid could be discontinued. The Supreme Court has since up-
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cuit Court of Appeal. Relying on close scrutiny of the language and 
legislative history of Title IX, the Third Circuit held that Title IX ap-
plied to both direct and indirect assistance and that colleges with 
students receiving BEOG grants were recipients of FFA for purposes 
of Title IX.139 
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third Cir-
cuit, concluding that the Department of Education could terminate 
Grove City’s status as a school eligible to enroll students receiving 
BEOG’s because of Grove City’s status as a recipient of FFA. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court looked to the statutory language 
of Title IX, Congress’s intent, and the Department’s administrative 
interpretation. 
According to the Court in Grove City College, the structure of 
the legislation creating the BEOG grant program and Title IX’s 
nondiscrimination requirement “strongly suggests” that the grants 
were intended to be a form of indirect FFA.140 The Court noted that 
Congresspersons referred to the special grants provision as the “cen-
terpiece of the bill”141 and that “Title IX ‘[related] directly to [its] 
central purpose.’”142 Thus, in the words of the Court, it would be 
“anomalous” to find that the grant program was not intended to 
“trigger coverage under Title IX.”143 
The Court stated that the text of Title IX’s nondiscrimination 
requirement contains no indication that Congress perceived any sub-
stantive difference between direct aid to a college and indirect aid re-
ceived by a college through its students. To the contrary, the Court 
refused to read limitations on Title IX’s applicability that were not 
apparent on the face of the statute.144 
The Court also determined that Congress’ intent and the De-
partment’s administrative interpretations support the conclusion that 
Grove City was a recipient of FFA for Title IX purposes. As noted by 
the Court, “the BEOG program was structured to ensure that it ef-
fectively supplements the College’s own financial aid program,”145 
and Congress was aware of this when it enacted amendments to Title 
IX in 1972.146 One of the purposes of those 1972 amendments relat-
 
held the validity of Subpart E in North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). 
 139. See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 140. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 563 (1984). 
 141. Id. (quoting from 118 Cong. Rec. 20297 (1972) (Rep. Pucinski)). 
 142. Id. (quoting from 117 Cong. Rec. 30412 (1971) (Sen. Bayh)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at 564. 
 145. Id. at 565. 
 146. See id. at 565–66 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92–554, at 244 (1972) (Supplemental 
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ing to student aid was to “[provide] assistance to institutions of 
higher education.”147 Notably, the legislative history of Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,148 after which Title IX was patterned,149 
indicates Congress’s contemplation that a school’s receipt of student 
aid funds (like those provided by the BEOG grants) would trigger 
Title VI coverage.150 The relevant coverage language contained in 
Title IX was identical to that contained in Title VI. Accordingly, the 
Court could find no reason to conclude that Congress envisioned a 
different meaning for FFA for Title IX purposes.151 Congress rein-
forced this view when it failed to overturn the Department’s admin-
istrative determination that FFA included government aid provided 
to students attending a particular school.152 
Grove City College demonstrates that “FFA,” for civil rights 
statutory purposes, essentially requires that a private entity receive 
some direct or indirect financial benefit from a governmental source. 
There is no requirement that the benefit be subject to governmental 
control or even governmental restrictions. In fact, unless the statute 
on its face expressly limits Title IX’s applicability, the Court has re-
sisted the idea that Title IX does not apply.153 Further, if the benefit 
 
Views)); 117 Cong. Rec. 2007 (Sen. Pell), 37778, 37782 (Rep. Quie), 39256 (Rep. Steiger) 
(1971); 118 Cong. Rec. 20295 (Rep. Reid), 20297 (Rep. Pucinski), 20312 (statement of 
Isaac K. Beckes), 20310 (letter from Kingman Brewster, Jr.), 20324 (Rep. Mitchell) (1972). 
 147. See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 566 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a)(5)). 
 148. Pub. L. 88–352, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–2007. Section 601 of Title VI 
provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national ori-
gin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 
 149. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 684–85 (1979); 118 Cong. 
Rec. 5807 (1972) (Sen. Bayh). 
 150. See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 566 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 104–105 (1963); 110 Cong. Rec. 13388 (1964) (Sen. McClellan)). 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. at 568. Relying on post-enactment legislative history, the Court in Grove City 
College noted: 
The Department’s sex discrimination regulations made clear that “scholarships, 
loans, [and] grants . . . extended directly to . . . students for payment to” an institu-
tion constitute federal financial assistance to that entity. 40 Fed. Reg. 24137 
(1975). . . . Congress was afforded an opportunity to invalidate aspects of the regu-
lations it deemed inconsistent with Title IX. The regulations were clear, and Secre-
tary Weinberger left no doubt [in congressional testimony] concerning the Depart-
ment’s position that “the furnishing of student assistance to a student who uses it at 
a particular institution . . . [is] Federal aid which is covered by the statute.” 
Id. (quoting Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Postsecond-
ary Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong. 482 (1975) 
(statement of Secretary Weinberger)). Yet, neither House passed a disapproval resolution. 
 153. See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 564. 
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at issue was intended by Congress to provide assistance to educa-
tional institutions, the Court will be inclined to find that the institu-
tions must comply with the relevant civil rights laws.154 Thus, it ap-
pears as though, so long as a private entity receives a traceable 
financial benefit from the federal government and Congress intended 
that benefit to be a type of assistance, that entity will be treated as a 
recipient of FFA. In these circumstances, such an entity is subject to 
the restrictions of Title IX. 
Further, since Title VI and Title IX are interpreted consistent 
with one another in regards to the FFA language,155 private entities 
receiving traceable financial benefits from the federal government are 
also subject to the restrictions of Title VI.156 Given this interpretive 
background, there still remains the question of whether courts 
should uniformly interpret FFA as including tax benefits. 
2. Tax-exemptions and tax deductions as FFA 
McGlotten v. Connally 157 and Bachman v. American Society of 
Clinical Pathologists,158 both decided by federal district courts prior 
to Grove City College, are the only two reported cases that exhaus-
tively address this question of whether FFA includes tax benefits.159 
 
 154. See id. at 566. 
 155. See discussion supra notes 151–52 and accompanying text. 
 156. See id. 
 157. 338 F. Supp. 448, 462 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 158. 577 F. Supp. 1257, 1265 (D.N.J. 1983). 
 159. While other courts have addressed the issue of the equivalence of tax benefits and 
FFA, none has provided as detailed analysis as that contained in McGlotten and Bachman. See, 
e.g., M.H.D. v. Westminster Schools, 172 F.3d 797, 802 n.12 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting ju-
risdiction of case because statute of limitation lapsed and concluding that a claim that tax-
exemption is FFA is neither immaterial nor wholly frivolous); Glantz v. Automotive Serv. Ass’n 
of Pa., Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18299, (E.D. Pa. 1991) (dismissing plaintiffs claim that 
private actor’s receipt of federal tax credits constitutes federal assistance under Title VI because 
plaintiff did not allege that plaintiff is intended beneficiary of the federal assistance); Paralyzed 
Veterans of Am. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that, 
while investment tax credits available to railroad and airline industries under § 46(a)(8) do not 
amount to assistance that triggers coverage by section 504, the McGlotten “fundamental” prin-
ciple that tax benefits may constitute FFA is sound); National Alliance v. United States, 710 
F.2d 868, 876 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (indicating that McGlotten and other like decisions “call 
into question whether an organization enjoying an educational tax exemption under federal 
law may deny membership on the basis of race”). Cf. Martin v. Delaware Law Sch. of Widener 
Univ., 625 F. Supp. 1288, 1302 n.13 (D. Del. 1985) (stating, under Rehabilitation Act, that 
“‘assistance’ connotes transfer of government funds by way of subsidy, not merely exemption 
from taxation”), aff’d, 884 F.2d 1384 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 966 (1989); Stewart v. 
New York Univ., 430 F. Supp. 1305, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding tax benefits insufficient 
to create FFA under Title VI). 
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a. McGlotten: Tax benefits may be FFA. The issue in McGlotten 
was whether FFA for Title VI purposes includes tax exemptions for 
nonprofit social clubs,160 tax exemptions for fraternal organiza-
tions,161 and tax deductions for contributions to fraternal organiza-
tions.162 McGlotten involved a class action suit filed against the Treas-
ury by a black man who was denied membership in a tax-exempt 
private club.163 The McGlotten plaintiff sought to enjoin the Treasury 
from granting tax exemption and tax deduction benefits to nonprofit 
social clubs and fraternal organizations that refuse membership to 
blacks. Among the plaintiff’s many grounds for relief was that these 
tax benefits are a type of FFA164 and, thus, violate Title VI’s prohibi-
tion against providing federal assistance to programs that discrimi-
nate based on race.165 
In analyzing the issue of whether tax benefits may count as FFA, 
the court in McGlotten relied primarily on the “plain purpose” of Ti-
tle VI since the legislative history contained no information on the 
issue.166 The court determined that the purpose of Title VI is to 
eliminate discrimination in programs or activities benefiting from 
FFA.167 Thus, the court viewed “[d]istinctions as to the method of 
distribution of federal funds or their equivalent [as] . . . beside the 
point.”168 Invoking tax expenditure theory,169 the court in McGlotten 
 
 160. The tax exemption for nonprofit social clubs is authorized by § 501(c)(7). Social 
clubs are described in § 501(c)(7) as “[c]lubs organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, 
recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the 
benefit of any private shareholder.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(7) (2000). 
 161. The tax exemption for fraternal organizations is authorized by § 501(c)(8). Frater-
nal organizations are described in § 501(c)(8) as entities “operating under the lodge system or 
for the exclusive benefit of the members of a fraternity itself operating under the lodge system, 
and providing for the payment of life, sick, accident, or other benefits to the members of such 
society, order, or association or their dependents.” Id. § 501(c)(8). 
 162. The tax deduction for contributions to fraternal organizations is authorized by  
§ 170(c)(4). Section 170(c)(4) provides that the term “charitable contribution” means a con-
tribution to or for the use of “a domestic fraternal society, order, or association, operating un-
der the lodge system, but only if such contribution or gift is to be used exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to 
children or animals.” Id. § 170(c)(4). 
 163. See McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 450. 
 164. The plaintiff in McGlotten asserted three separate bases for relief: (1) that granting 
the tax benefits violates the Constitution, (2) that the Internal Revenue Code does not author-
ize granting these tax benefits, and (3) that granting the tax benefits violates Title VI. See id. 
 165. See id. at 450, 460–62. 
 166. Id. at 461 (“In the absence of strong legislative history to the contrary, the plain 
purpose of the statute is controlling.”). 
 167. See id. 
 168. Id. 
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concluded that the only significant issue with respect to the specific 
tax benefits granted to social clubs and fraternal organizations was 
whether these benefits “relate primarily to the operation of the tax 
itself.”170 If so, the specific benefit is not the type of federal assistance 
contemplated by Congress as compelling Title VI coverage.171 
The court in McGlotten concluded that the social club tax ex-
emption is not FFA because it is limited to member-generated funds 
only and it is available to social clubs no matter what activity the club 
conducts.172 The limitation to member-generated funds173 indicates 
that the social club tax exemption is granted simply as a result of 
Congress’s desire to properly define income that should be tax-
able.174 According to the Court, member-generated funds should not 
be taxed because the funds are merely “shifted from one pocket to 
another, both within the same pair of pants.”175 Thus, the social club 
exemption reflects the perception that, as to member-generated 
funds, social clubs do not operate as entities separate from their 
members.176 Further, the social club’s tax exemption (regardless of 
the activity the club conducts) indicates that the government is not 
encouraging discrimination by the “appearance of government ap-
proval.”177 
 
 169. See Sugin, supra note 22, at 447 (“Applying tax expenditure analysis[,] . . . Judge 
Bazelon, in McGlotten v. Connally, compared the section 170 deduction to a government 
matching grant, relying on the rhetoric of tax expenditure analysis to distinguish such grants 
from ‘the structure of an income tax based on ability to pay.’”). 
 170. McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 461. (“[T]he deductions provided in the Code are not 
all cut from the same cloth. Most relate primarily to the operation of the tax itself, and thus 
would not constitute a grant of FFA.”). 
 171. See id. 
 172. See id. at 462. 
 173. According to the McGlotten court, all income of nonprofit social clubs, including 
passive income, is taxed at regular corporate rates by § 511 as unrelated business taxable in-
come. See id. at 457–58. However, income derived from members is exempt from this unre-
lated business income tax as “exempt function income.” Id. at 458. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See id. 
 177. Id. It is unclear from the McGlotten opinion whether the court’s analysis with re-
spect to “government approval” was necessary to decide the Title VI coverage issue because of 
the court’s cross-reference within the opinion from its Title VI analysis to its constitutional 
analysis. See id. at 462 n.71. The obstacles involved with trying to establish that the actions of a 
private actor constitute state action for constitutional law purposes are huge, see Sugin, supra 
note 22, at 431 (“The lack of government control inherent in provision of tax benefits sup-
ports the argument that such benefits cannot constitute state action.”), but the task is not in-
surmountable. See Burton v. Wilmington Park Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that pri-
vate restaurant’s decision to exclude blacks was state action because restaurant was tenant of 
city-owned parking garage, even though city had no control over operations of restaurant). 
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Unlike the social club tax exemption, the court in McGlotten 
concluded that the fraternal order tax exemption is FFA because it 
exempts all income from taxation (including passive investment in-
come) and is available only to government-specified groups conduct-
ing only government-specified activities.178 The fraternal order tax 
exemption is not simply a way of defining taxable income.179 Instead, 
according to the court, this tax exemption “operates in fact as a sub-
sidy in favor of the particular activities these groups are pursuing,” 
unlike the social club tax exemption, which is available no matter 
what activity the social club conducts.180 Since the fraternal order tax 
exemption is more of a specific subsidy, as opposed to a general sub-
sidy like the social club tax exemption, the court concluded that the 
fraternal order tax exemption is FFA for Title VI purposes.181 The 
McGlotten court also determined that the fraternal order tax deduc-
tion is clearly FFA because the deduction is not required for income-
defining purposes.182 Instead, the tax deduction acts as a matching 
government grant available for government-specified purposes and 
to government-specified organizations.183 
The McGlotten case, thus, provides a two-tiered analysis for 
courts to determine if a particular tax benefit is FFA. First, the tax 
benefit must be the type that Congress intended as more than an in-
come-defining provision.184 For example, if Congress’s intent when 
 
Nevertheless, the accepted view is that tax benefits do not suffice to transform a private actor 
into a state actor. See Sugin, supra note 22, at 432 n.115 (“Burton has never been extended to 
apply to tax benefits, and although it has not been overruled, its continuing validity, even on 
its own terms, is questionable”). See also McCoy v. Schultz, 73–1 USTC ¶ 9233 (D.D.C. 
1973) (“[T]he tax classification of private entities no more transforms that entity into an arm 
of the government than the grant by a state of a tax exemption to a religious body constitutes 
state establishment of religion.”). Further, this monumental step by the court was unnecessary 
for the court’s more reasoned conclusion that tax-exemption and tax deduction may be con-
sidered forms of FFA. 
 178. See McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 462. 
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. at 462; see Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reforms: The Varied Ap-
proaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. 
L. REV. 352, 384 (1970) (“The charitable contribution deduction is a special tax provision not 
required by, and contrary to, widely accepted definitions of income applicable to the determi-
nation of the structure of an income tax.”). 
 183. See McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 462. 
 184. This article’s discussion of congressional intent with respect to tax benefits for chari-
ties is somewhat illusory because Congress never expressly intended anything with respect to 
these tax benefits. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the 
Charity Tax Exemption, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 585, 590 n.23 (1998) (“[F]ew recorded expres-
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enacting a particular tax benefit was to exempt from tax an amount 
that fits properly within the definition of taxable income,185 that 
amount is more likely be treated as FFA.186 Second, if that same tax 
benefit is granted on condition that the beneficiary limit its activities 
to government-specified purposes, a court following McGlotten will 
probably treat the benefit as FFA.187 
This two-tiered analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
approach in Grove City College that FFA essentially requires that a 
private entity receive direct or indirect financial benefit from a gov-
ernmental source.188 However, in light of Grove City College, McGlot-
ten’s conclusion that the tax benefit recipient be subject to govern-
mental approval is questionable.189 In Grove City College, the 
Supreme Court resisted the idea that Title IX was inapplicable with-
out finding inapplicability apparent on the face of the statute.190 In-
stead of McGlotten’s approach requiring that the tax benefit be en-
 
sions exist of legislative intent for enacting a tax benefit for charity.”). According to Professor 
Brody, one exception to this lack of express congressional intent is in “the legislative history to 
Congress’s 1938 decision that charity begins at home.” See id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1938)). In 1938, the House Ways and Means Committee reported: 
The bill provides that the deduction . . . be also restricted to contributions made to 
domestic institutions. The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted 
to charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is 
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would 
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits 
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare. 
H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19. 
 185. The term “taxable income” is a term of art in tax law that refers to those statutorily 
defined items that are considered when deciding how much income tax is due. See, e.g., I.R.C. 
§ 1(a) (2000) (describing tax liability for married individuals filing jointly as function of “tax-
able income” and specified tax rates). “Taxable income” generally means the excess of gross 
income over allowed deductions. See id. § 63. 
 186. See McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 461. A key aspect of tax expenditure theory is the 
manner by which tax-base defining tax benefits are distinguished from those tax benefits that 
do not define the tax base. While some benefits are clearly base-defining and others not, there 
are many benefits that are subject to multiple interpretations. See Independent Sector Comments 
on JCT Disclosure Study For Exempts, 2000 TNT 54–95 n.1 (2000) (contrasting arguments for 
treating charitable contributions as subsidies or as essential elements of income tax base); Mary 
Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of Employment-Related Childcare Expendi-
tures, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307 (1998). 
 187. See McGlotten, 338 F. Supp. at 461. 
 188. See discussion supra notes 130–56 and accompanying text. 
 189. The portion of McGlotten that discusses the requirement that a tax benefit must be 
encapsulated with government approval probably went too far for civil rights statutory pur-
poses. Instead, this type of requirement would likely be more appropriate for determining if a 
benefit is sufficient to transform a private actor into a state actor for constitutional law pur-
poses. See discussion supra note 177. 
 190. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564 (1984). 
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meshed with government approval, the Supreme Court would likely 
only require that Congress expressly intend a specified benefit (like 
BEOG funds for students) to the particular organization.191 Cou-
pling the Grove City College analysis with the McGlotten analysis re-
sults in an interpretive framework in which a tax benefit will be 
treated as FFA if the benefit provides financial assistance to the bene-
fited organization and Congress intended to assist that organization. 
b. Bachman: Tax benefits are never FFA. In contrast, a different 
federal court examining the issue of whether tax benefits may be 
treated as FFA concluded that tax benefits can never be FFA because 
Congress did not intend so.192 In Bachman v. American Society of 
Clinical Pathologists, a person afflicted with dyslexia sued a tax-
exempt medical society (“ASCP”) for failing to comply with section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“section 504”).193 The ASCP 
received no direct federal funding. The plaintiff alleged, in part, that 
the ASCP medical society was a recipient of FFA for section 504 
purposes because of the society’s tax-exempt status. The court’s 
opinion in Bachman does not indicate the Internal Revenue Code 
provision under which the medical society was exempt.194 Neverthe-
less, the court in Bachman concluded that Congress did not intend 
section 504 “to cover tax-exempt institutions absent any further af-
firmative federal financial assistance.”195 
In reaching its conclusion that FFA under section 504 does not 
cover tax exemption, the court in Bachman relied on the plain mean-
ing of section 504, the administrative definition of FFA, and inter-
pretations of other statutes similar to section 504.196 Without much 
explanation, the court noted that the term “assistance” in FFA 
means transfer of government money by subsidy, not exemption.197 
The court also noted that the Department of Health Education and 
Welfare’s administrative regulation defining FFA does not list tax-
exemption among the various forms of assistance.198 Finally, the 
 
 191. See id. at 566. 
 192. See Bachman v. American Soc’y of Clinical Pathologists, 577 F. Supp. 1257 (D.N.J 
1983). 
 193. See id. at 1259; Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000). 
 194. The court in Bachman refers to the medical society throughout the opinion as non-
profit and tax-exempt. Thus, it is unclear what Internal Revenue Code provision authorized 
the medical society’s federal tax-exemption. 
 195. See Bachman, 577 F. Supp. at 1264. 
 196. See id. at 1264–65. 
 197. See id. at 1264. Although the court in Bachman did cite to cases indicating that “as-
sistance” does not include government contracts, it did not explain how or why government 
contracts are necessarily the same as tax-exemption. See id. 
 198. See id. The Health Education and Welfare Department defined FFA as: 
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court in Bachman evaluated how Title IX was interpreted. The court 
reasoned that, because courts in cases like Grove City College rely on 
an educational institution’s receipt of grants and loans, FFA must 
not include tax exemption.199 
The court’s narrow interpretation of FFA in Bachman is clearly 
at odds with the broader definition urged by the Supreme Court in 
Grove City College v. Bell,200 especially where the Supreme Court 
says: 
Nothing in [Title IX] suggests that Congress elevated form over 
substance by making the application of the nondiscrimination prin-
ciple dependent on the manner in which a program or activity re-
ceives federal assistance. There is no basis in [Title IX] for the view 
that only institutions that themselves apply for federal aid or receive 
checks directly from the Federal Government are subject to regula-
tion. As the Court of Appeals observed, “by its all inclusive termi-
nology [Title IX] appears to encompass all forms of federal aid to 
education, direct or indirect.” We have recognized the need to “ac-
cord [Title IX] a sweep as broad as its language,” and we are reluc-
tant to read into Title IX a limitation not apparent on its face.201 
The court’s definition of FFA in Bachman is narrow in that the 
court refused to extend the definition beyond those particular forms 
of FFA already recognized in either the statute, regulation, or judi-
cial decisions.202 In Grove City College, the Supreme Court urges 
against such a narrow view of this important jurisdictional term.203 In 
comparison to the grudging interpretation of the Bachman court, 
McGlotten took a broad view of the scope of civil rights protections 
by requiring only that the tax benefit be non-income-defining and 
 
[A]ny grant, loan, contract (other than a procurement contract or a contract of in-
surance or guaranty), or any other arrangement by which the Department provides 
or otherwise makes available assistance in the form of: 
(1) Funds; 
(2) Services of Federal personnel; or 
(3) Real and personal property or any interest in or use of such property, including: 
(i) Transfers or leases of such property for less than fair market value or for reduced 
consideration; and 
(ii) Proceeds from a subsequent transfer or lease of such property if the Federal share 
of its fair market value is not returned to the Federal Government. 
Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (1983)). 
 199. See id. at 1264–65. 
 200. See discussion supra notes 130–56 and accompanying text. 
 201. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 564 (1984). 
 202. See Bachman, 577 F. Supp. at 1264–65. 
 203. See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 564. 
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the activities supported by the tax benefit not be government-
specified.204 
c. Conclusions. The broader interpretations of FFA in Grove City 
College and McGlotten are the preferred method of interpretation in 
terms of maximizing protections to those persons whose federal civil 
rights are violated. Under this broader interpretive approach es-
poused by the Supreme Court and implemented in McGlotten, civil 
rights litigants will spend more time on substantive issues (e.g., de-
ciding whether a defendant’s actions are discriminatory) than on 
nonsubstantive ones (e.g., deciding whether the form of financial 
benefit is sufficient for coverage purposes).205 Furthermore, the over-
arching social justice goal of maximizing human liberty will be en-
hanced. 
However, even in the face of this Supreme Court analysis, the 
Bachman opinion demonstrates that, because the Supreme Court has 
not ruled that certain tax benefits are equivalent to expenditures of 
tax revenues, some lower courts will find ways around imposing civil 
rights restrictions on nontraditional defendants.206 It is very likely 
that, if the tax benefit at issue in Bachman were provided to the 
nonprofit ASCP medical society in the form of a grant or loan from 
the government (as with a typical FFA defendant), the dyslexic plain-
tiff would have succeeded in her coverage claim.207 Yet, because the 
financial benefit to the ASCP in Bachman was provided via a tax ex-
emption, the dyslexic plaintiff lost his chance to litigate this poten-
tially viable claim. 
There are justifiable reasons for limiting the ability of civil rights 
plaintiffs to successfully sue potential civil rights defendants.208 These 
reasons, however, should be based on the substantive effects of per-
mitting the claim, not on the form in which the defendant receives 
the financial benefit. As Part IV of this article demonstrates, tax ex-
penditure theory presents an opportunity to utilize substance, not 
 
 204. See discussion supra notes 160–87 and accompanying text. 
 205. Professor Sugin suggests that a strong view of tax expenditure analysis actually limits 
social justice “by limiting the legal consequences of different tax provisions depending on their 
categorization as income-defining or not.” See Sugin, supra note 22, at 474. 
 206. See discussion supra notes 192–99 and accompanying text. The phrase “non-
traditional defendant” is a reference to those civil rights defendants who are not state actors 
and who do not receive traditional forms of FFA like government loans or grants. 
 207. Accord Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (indicating that exempting 
religious property from state property tax does not violate religious clause of First Amendment, 
although exempting said property and paying the religious owner an amount equivalent to the 
tax paid would violate First Amendment). 
 208. For example, the limitation that constitutional civil rights claims be made against 
state actors only. 
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form, to determine when a tax benefit is FFA and thus avoid these 
unjust results.209 
IV. TAX EXPENDITURE THEORY: ECONOMIC EQUIVALENCE V. 
CONSTITUTIONAL EQUIVALENCE 
A central aspect of this article’s thesis involves explaining how a 
legal concept—the equivalence of tax expenditures and direct expen-
ditures—can be examined on multiple levels. This article uses the ex-
ample of government funding of religion to illustrate this point. 
When government chooses to take action that might provide an eco-
nomic benefit to religion, it has at least two options. On the one 
hand, government could authorize certain tax benefits that inure to 
religious organizations. Conversely, government could authorize the 
disbursement of direct grants to religious organizations. Either of 
these government options to fund religion may have the same finan-
cial or economic impact on religion (economic equivalence). Never-
theless, these same government options may be very different consti-
tutionally in that one option may be constitutionally permissible 
under the First Amendment whereas the other option may be consti-
tutionally impermissible (constitutional equivalence).210 Thus, two 
government funding options can be the same economically, yet differ 
constitutionally. As the discussion of the religion cases in this Part 
develops, the reader should focus on separating the economic equiva-
lence question from the constitutional equivalence question. 
A. Equivalence as an Essential Element of Tax Expenditure Theory 
Tax expenditure theory essentially provides that the legal effect 
of certain tax benefits should be analyzed as if the government had 
provided the recipient of the tax benefit an equivalent grant of 
 
 209. See, e.g., Sugin, supra note 22, at 473: 
The anti-discrimination approach in equal protection analysis parallels the . . . ap-
proach in traditional tax policy. They are both concerned with the government 
treating like-situated people alike, without inquiring into the historical, social and 
institutional questions that surround what it means to be alike. While formal justice 
in this sense may be all that the Constitution requires for equal protection, . . . tax 
policy’s aspirations can be more expansive. Tax policy can be about defining and 
achieving substantive equality, even if it is beyond what the Constitution requires, 
and even though it requires explicitly linking tax policy to ideas that are outside its 
traditional borders. 
 210. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the discussion of religion cases in Part IV.B., two 
different tax benefits for religion may provide the same or similar economic benefits to relig-
ion. However, one of these tax benefits may be constitutional and the other may be unconsti-
tutional. See, e.g., discussion infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
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money.211 For example, if a taxpayer receives a tax deduction for con-
tributing money to a charity, tax expenditure theory would require 
the law to treat the dollar value of the deduction as equivalent to a 
grant of money by the government to the taxpayer-donor.212 Simi-
larly, if a taxpayer is exempt from the requirement to pay federal in-
come tax, tax expenditure theory would mandate that the law treat 
the dollar value of the exemption as a grant of money by the gov-
ernment to the exempt taxpayer.213 Pursuant to tax expenditure the-
ory, the equivalency of tax benefits and direct government expendi-
tures applies only to tax benefits enacted to implement social 
policy—not those intended as a further delineation of the appropri-
 
 211. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX 
EXPENDITURES 6–7, 30–49 (1973); STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX 
EXPENDITURES 1–30 (1985). See also Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 
U.S. 540, 544 (1983) [hereinafter TWR] (“Both tax exemptions and tax deductibility are a 
form of subsidy that are administered through the tax system.”). 
 212. For direct grant equivalency purposes, the dollar value of a tax deduction is generally 
computed by multiplying the amount of the tax deduction times the marginal tax rate of the 
deduction recipient. For example, if for the annual tax year 2000 an individual with $150,000 
of taxable income gave a charity $10,000 in cash, so that the individual had $140,000 of tax-
able income after the contribution, the dollar value of that contribution to the individual con-
tributor is roughly $10,000 x 31% (or $3,100). See generally I.R.C. §§ 1, 63, 170(a) (2000). 
This calculation does not account for the dollar value of the personal exemption phase-out, the 
overall limitation on itemized deductions, or any state tax benefits that flow from the contribu-
tion. See also TWR, 461 U.S. at 544 (“Deductible contributions are similar to cash grants of 
the amount of a portion of the individual’s contributions.”). 
 213. For example, if for the annual tax year 2000 a corporate taxpayer with $50,000 of 
taxable income qualified under § 501(c)(3) of the Code as a tax-exempt charity, the dollar 
value of the tax exemption to the exempt taxpayer is roughly $50,000 x 15% (or $7,500). See 
generally I.R.C. §§ 11, 501(a), 501(c)(3) (2000). This calculation does not account for the 
dollar value of any state tax benefits or any other non-tax benefits that flow from charitable 
status. See also TWR, 461 U.S. at 544 (“A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash 
grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income.”). Revoca-
tion or denial of charitable status would likely mean loss of many other federal benefits, includ-
ing (1) the ability to receive tax-deductible contributions from the public, I.R.C. § 170; (2) 
exemption from the federal unemployment tax, I.R.C. § 3306(c)(8); (3) eligibility for pre-
ferred postal rates, 39 C.F.R. § 111.1 (2000); (4) ability to issue tax-exempt bonds, I.R.C.  
§ 145; and (5) ability to provide certain types of tax-deferred retirement plans for employees, 
I.R.C. § 403(b). The many state benefits that also hinge on an organization maintaining tax-
exempt charitable status include exemption from (1) real property taxes; (2) sales and use 
taxes; (3) business and occupational taxes; (4) state unemployment taxes; and (5) the require-
ment to pay certain permit or license fees. See generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF 
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 3.2 (7th ed. 1998); JAMES J. FISHMAN ET AL., NONPROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS, 314–15 (1995). In fact, some charities obtain fed-
eral tax-exempt status merely to obtain these state benefits. See id. at 335. “Many nonprofits 
do not earn a significant net profit or rely on charitable contributions as a major source of their 
support. State and local tax exemptions may be the most significant governmental benefit for 
these organizations, especially if they own real property.” Id. 
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ate tax base.214 Thus, a central element of pure tax expenditure the-
ory is the notion that tax benefits implemented to accomplish social 
policy and government expenditures implemented for the same pur-
pose are equivalent, both economically and constitutionally.215 
This article’s view is that economic equivalence is very different 
from constitutional equivalence. This view is reflected in the discus-
sion of the religion cases in Part IV.B. This view is also consistent 
with recent academic commentary questioning the value of tax ex-
penditure theory in judicial decision making for constitutional law 
purposes.216 These scholars accept that tax expenditure theory and its 
economic equivalence concepts are relevant for some purposes.217 
However, the scholars contend that courts should place less emphasis 
on economic equivalence when making constitutional law decisions 
and more emphasis on the particular constitutional context. For ex-
ample, one scholar “calls for a case-by-case determination[] of 
equivalence by considering the particular constitutional contexts, the 
specific tax and direct spending programs at issue, and the appropri-
ate perspective in each of those contexts.”218 Another scholar simi-
 
 214. See SURREY, supra note 211, at 6 (“The federal . . . tax system consists. . . of two 
parts: one part comprises the structural provisions necessary to implement the income tax. . . ; 
the second part comprises a system of tax expenditures under which . . . financial assistance 
programs are carried out through special tax provisions rather than through direct Government 
expenditures.”); SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 211, at 3 (“[A]n income tax is composed 
of two . . . elements[:] structural provisions necessary to implement the normal income tax, 
such as the definition of income. . . . [and] special preferences . . . [that are]. . . departures 
from the normative tax structure [and] represent government spending for favored activi-
ties . . . effected through the tax system rather than through direct . . . government assis-
tance.”); Zelinsky, supra note 22, at 381 n.2 (“The . . . premise of [the] theory is that tax pro-
visions [are] divided into ‘normative’ provisions, which are necessary to implement the 
theoretical base of the tax, and provisions that are adopted to implement policies extraneous to 
the tax base. These latter provisions . . . are . . . government[] expenditures; hence the term 
‘tax expenditures.’”). This aspect of tax expenditure theory, distinguishing so-called structural 
tax benefit provisions from nonstructural ones, is the source of much controversy. See, e.g., Su-
gin, supra note 22, at 418 (“One of the problems with tax expenditure analysis’s insistence 
that economically equivalent tax and spending programs be analyzed consistently, even in con-
stitutional cases, is that it gives the definition of a tax expenditure constitutional importance.”). 
 215. See Sugin, supra note 22, at 410 (“The basic insight of tax expenditure analysis is 
very simple: there is no economic distinction between the government’s direct subsidy of an 
activity or institution and its grant of an equivalent tax break for that activity or institution.”). 
 216. See Zelinsky, supra note 22; Sugin, supra note 22. 
 217. See, e.g., Sugin, supra. note 22, at 408 (“Policymakers and scholars have long recog-
nized that direct spending programs and tax subsidies can be economically equivalent.”). 
 218. See Zelinsky, supra note 22, at 382. Professor Zelinsky states that it is inappropriate 
to make categorical statements, as tax expenditure theorists do, about equivalency without 
some focus on the particular context. See id. Zelinsky explains that, for constitutional equiva-
lency purposes, the terms “tax” and “direct expenditure” are not very helpful. The problem 
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larly calls for a less strict adherence to the traditional view of tax ex-
penditure theory and instead calls for adoption of a qualified version 
of tax expenditure theory. This qualified version of the theory, she 
continues, should “applaud[] the important lessons of tax expendi-
ture analysis for policy making . . . and the analytic prescriptions for 
legislatures that flow from that equivalence.”219 She adds that the 
qualified version also recognizes that a pure “version of tax expendi-
ture analysis gives economic equivalence too much normative force, 
and that courts have only limited use for the tax expenditure budget 
in legal analysis.”220 
This Part explains how tax expenditure theory is applied to reach 
appropriate results in interpreting selected statutes and constitutional 
provisions. Typically, the Supreme Court addresses the equivalence 
issue in the constitutional law context.221 In addition, academic 
 
with these generic terms, Zelinsky continues, is the “diverse and overlapping nature of different 
tax laws and direct spending programs, the disparate perspectives from which equivalence can 
be assessed, and the variety of constitutional contexts in which the equivalence issue must be 
addressed.” Id. at 381. Zelinsky concludes that legal decision makers should compare “particu-
lar tax and spending programs case-by-case with appropriate concern for particular constitu-
tional provisions.” Id. at 433. 
 219. See Sugin, supra note 22, at 412. Professor Sugin, like Professor Zelinsky, rejects tax 
expenditure theory to the extent it commands that non-base-defining tax benefits should al-
ways be treated as equivalent to direct expenditures by government. See id. At the heart of Su-
gin’s thesis is her critique of what she calls the strong version of tax expenditure theory, sub-
jecting tax expenditures to “the full panoply of constitutional and statutory restrictions on 
government spending.” Id. at 410. She states that tax expenditure theory “imposes inappropri-
ate restraints on adjudication and improperly reduces judicial scrutiny of provisions that are not 
classified as tax expenditures.” Id. at 412. Sugin continues that tax expenditure theory “gives 
tax expenditures the same legal consequences as economically equivalent direct-spending pro-
grams, even where the legal standard does not depend on economic equivalence.” Id. at 412–
13. Sugin concludes that tax expenditure analysis is better suited for legislatures and not courts 
because tax expenditure theory “gives economic equivalence too much normative force and [] 
courts have only limited use for the tax expenditure budget in legal analysis.” Id.  
 220. See id. at 412. 
 221. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996) (holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires state military college to admit 
women into traditionally all-male college); Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (holding that state school student activity fund’s refusal to pay printing 
costs for student organization that published articles with religious themes was content-based 
regulation of speech violating First and Fourteenth Amendments); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 
U.S. 664 (1970) (holding that New York’s property tax exemption for various types of prop-
erty, including religious property, did not violate First Amendment); West Lynn Creamery, 
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194–95 (1994) (holding that Commerce Clause prohibited state 
from refunding milk tax revenues to residents only); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. 
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 595 (1997) (holding that Commerce Clause prohibited state from 
denying local property tax exemption to nonprofit summer camp that predominantly served 
nonresidents). 
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commentary on equivalence has focused almost exclusively on consti-
tutional issues, not statutory ones.222 Though their ultimate concern 
is with Constitutional results, these decisions and academic commen-
tary provide useful guidance for deciding the statutory issue of 
whether tax benefits provided to tax-exempt charities should be 
treated as FFA under federal civil rights statutes. As the analysis in 
this Part shows, there is no logical (or legal) reason for treating the 
tax benefits received by charities as anything other than equivalent to 
government grants or loans for purposes of interpreting relevant civil 
rights statutes. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Uniform Acceptance of Economic Equivalence 
in Constitutional Decision Making 
Analysis of the Supreme Court’s religion clause cases shows that 
the Court treats tax benefits as constitutionally equivalent to gov-
ernment expenditures by accepting economic equivalence as a given. 
Thus, the Court’s religion clause cases broadly support a key com-
ponent of this article’s thesis—tax benefits for charities should be 
viewed as FFA under federal civil rights statutes. These cases show, 
by analogy, that it is perfectly plausible to treat tax benefits as legally 
equivalent to grants, loans, and other forms of FFA. In these cases, 
tax benefits serve as the economic assistance to religion that triggers 
serious First Amendment concerns about impermissible aid to relig-
ion. If the Court did not view tax benefits as economic assistance to 
religion, there would be no aid in the first place, and the religion 
clause would presumably not even be triggered. Taken as a whole 
then, these religion clause cases strongly support treating tax benefits 
for charities as a form of FFA because the Court uniformly accepts 
that tax benefits are a form of economic assistance, even when the 
justices are otherwise divided on the sensitive issue223 of constitu-
tional equivalence.224 
 
 222. See Zelinsky, supra note 22 (discussing application of tax expenditure theory in vari-
ous constitutional contexts); Sugin, supra note 22 (discussing application of tax expenditure 
theory in various constitutional contexts). But see Mary L. Heen, Reinventing Tax Expenditure 
Reform: Improving Program Oversight under the Government Performance and Results Act, 35 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751 (2000) (discussing incorporation of tax expenditures into the pro-
gram performance review process established by the Government Performance and Results Act 
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993)). 
 223. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971) (“[C]andor compels the ac-
knowledgment that we can only dimly perceive the boundaries of permissible government ac-
tivity in this sensitive area.”). 
 224. This article does not intend to stretch the analogy of these cases much beyond this 
point. Once it is accepted that the tax benefit at issue is a form of economic assistance to relig-
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1. Walz v. Tax Commission 
In the context of the First Amendment’s religion clause cases, 
Walz v. Tax Commission 225 is the oldest case in which the Supreme 
Court closely examined the issue of the equivalence of tax benefits 
and direct expenditures.226 Walz involved a suit by a real property 
owner seeking to enjoin the New York City Tax Commission from 
granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations that used 
their property exclusively for religious purposes.227 The property 
owner complained that the tax exemption “indirectly require[d him] 
to make a contribution to religious bodies and thereby violate[d] 
provisions prohibiting establishment of religion under the First 
 
ion, from that point the decisions turn most on whether the particular type of assistance vio-
lates the neutrality norms that animate religion clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. 
at 674–75. On this point, the Supreme Court has said: 
Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect eco-
nomic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than taxing 
them. In analyzing either alternative the questions are whether the involvement is 
excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing sur-
veillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement. Obviously a direct 
money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with involvement and, as with most 
governmental grant programs, could encompass sustained and detailed administra-
tive relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards, but that is 
not this case. 
Id. Thus, the focus in these religion cases—on whether the tax benefit increases or decreases 
government involvement with religion—is a step beyond the focus in civil rights cases involv-
ing the existence of FFA. 
 As with its First Amendment religion clause cases, the Supreme Court would also likely 
require, at a minimum, a transfer of economic assistance when evaluating the equivalence issue 
for Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause purposes. A recent case decided by the 
Supreme Court brings this issue to the forefront. VMI, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). Even though 
VMI did not directly involve a tax/expenditure equivalence issue, it is clear that the case has 
serious implications for tax expenditure theorists. See Zelinsky, supra note 22; Sugin, supra 
note 22. 
 225. Walz, 397 U.S. at 664. 
 226. Other cases include Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 
U.S. 756 (1973); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 
489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 227. Walz, 397 U.S. at 666. New York’s property tax exemption law provided in relevant 
part that 
[r]eal property owned by a corporation or association organized exclusively for the 
moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious, bible, tract, 
charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, public play-
ground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic, histori-
cal or cemetery purposes . . . and used exclusively for carrying out thereupon one or 
more of such purposes . . . shall be exempt from taxation as provided in this section. 
Id. at 667 n.1 (quoting from section 420, paragraph 1, of the New York Real Property Tax 
Law). 
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Amendment . . . .”228 The United States Supreme Court disagreed 
with the property owner’s conclusion that the exemption amounted 
to establishment of religion and, accordingly, upheld the property 
tax exemption law.229 
While acknowledging that the tax benefit for religion—here a 
property tax exemption—clearly aided religion in some manner, the 
Court closely scrutinized the exemption to determine if this admit-
ted financial support of religion exceeded constitutional limits. Chief 
Justice Burger, for the six justice majority, stated that “the ‘estab-
lishment’ of a religion connote[s] sponsorship, financial support, and 
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”230 Burger 
continued that the basic objective of the Establishment clause and 
the Free Exercise clause “is to insure that no religion be sponsored 
or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited.”231 Thus, 
“[s]hort of th[ese] expressly proscribed governmental acts there is 
room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality 
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and 
without interference.”232 According to Chief Justice Burger, the key 
lies not in merely determining whether a government act “aids” re-
ligion but in determining “whether the particular acts in question are 
intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices 
or have the effect of doing so.”233 
 
 228. Id. at 667. The relevant portions of the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provide that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 229. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 667. 
 230. Id. at 668 (emphasis added). 
 231. Id. at 669. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 670–71. The majority in Walz determined that New York’s legislative purpose 
for the property tax exemption was neither advancement nor inhibition of religion. Rather, the 
purpose of the exemption was that property taxes should not inhibit the activities of “certain 
entities that exist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its 
‘moral or mental improvement.’” Id. at 672. Included amongst these general types of entities 
were all houses of religious worship, hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, 
historical, and patriotic groups. See id. at 673. In addition to determining that the legislative 
purpose of the New York property tax was not to establish, sponsor, or support religion, the 
Court in Walz concluded that the effect of the property tax exemption was not an excessive 
government entanglement with religion. See id. at 674. While either exempting religious prop-
erty from tax or imposing a tax on religious property necessarily involves some degree of en-
tanglement, the majority in Walz concluded that taxing religion “would tend to expand the 
involvement of government.” Id. Indeed, taxing religion, according to the Court, might give 
rise to valuation concerns, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and con-
flicts that follow. See id. Thus, while “[g]ranting tax exemptions to churches necessarily oper-
ates to afford an indirect economic benefit,” it “also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, in-
volvement than taxing them.” Id. at 674–75. 
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On the issue of constitutional equivalence of this tax benefit to a 
hypothetical direct expenditure, the Court majority in Walz clearly 
discerned a difference of constitutional significance but never denied 
that the tax benefit was a financial subsidy for religion. While a “di-
rect money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with involve-
ment and, as with most governmental grant programs, could en-
compass sustained and detailed administrative relationships for 
enforcement of statutory or administrative standards,” a tax benefit 
subsidy does not share this quality.234 The majority contended that 
granting a tax exemption is not sponsorship because the government 
does not transfer part of its revenue to churches. Instead, it simply 
does not require or demand that churches support the state.235 
In their concurring and dissenting opinions, Justices Brennan, 
Harlan, and Douglas similarly acknowledged that the tax benefit to 
religion in Walz is indeed a form of financial aide to religion. Justice 
Brennan, in his concurrence, concluded that the tax exemption for 
religion was not constitutionally equivalent to a direct subsidy to re-
ligion.236 In Justice Brennan’s view, tax exemptions and direct subsi-
dies are very different for constitutional law purposes because of the 
differing levels of entanglement. So different in fact that a direct sub-
sidy would be clearly unconstitutional,237 whereas an indirect subsidy 
by way of tax exemption is completely permissible.238 In his concur-
rence, Justice Harlan also discerned a constitutionally significant dif-
ference between tax exemptions and direct subsidies.239 Justice 
 
 234. See id. at 675. 
 235. See id. The majority also noted that “[n]o one has ever suggested that tax exemp-
tion has converted libraries, art galleries, or hospitals into arms of the state or put its employees 
‘on the public payroll.’” Id. 
 236. See id. at 680–94 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 237. See id. at 690 (“General subsidies of religious activities would, of course, constitute 
impermissible state involvement with religion.”). 
 238. See id. at 691 (“Tax exemptions . . . constitute mere passive state involvement with 
religion and not the affirmative involvement characteristic of outright governmental subsidy.”). 
 239. See id. at 694–700 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment). However, Justice 
Harlan focused on a procedural difference between tax exemptions and direct subsidies that 
resulted in subsidies inviting more political controversy (and hence more government involve-
ment) than tax exemptions. See id. at 699 (“Subsidies, unlike exemptions, must be passed on 
periodically and thus invite more political controversy than exemptions. Moreover, subsidies or 
direct aid, as a general rule, are granted on the basis of enumerated and more complicated 
qualifications and frequently involve the state in administration to a higher degree, though to 
be sure, this is not necessarily the case.”). Justice Harlan specifically refused to recognize any 
substantive or economic distinction. See id. (“I agree with my Brother DOUGLAS that exemp-
tions do not differ from subsidies as an economic matter.”). Unlike the rest of the majority, 
Justice Harlan also refused to draw the necessary conclusion that a direct subsidy to churches 
would necessarily violate the First Amendment. See id. Justice Harlan writes: 
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Douglas, for the dissent, saw tax exemptions and tax subsidies as 
constitutionally equivalent, viewing the tax exemption as “financial 
support” for religion.240 In evaluating the majority’s uniform conclu-
sion that tax exemptions might or should be treated as anything but 
direct subsidies, Justice Douglas questioned the meaning of the ma-
jority’s analysis.241 Nevertheless, Douglas, like the Burger majority, 
the Brennan concurrence, and the Harlan concurrence, never ques-
tioned whether the tax exemption was a financial aide to religion. 
In sum, the form of the admitted benefit to religion—a tax ex-
emption benefit instead of a direct grant or other expenditure—
significantly influenced the Court’s conclusion regarding the consti-
tutionality of New York’s property tax exemption law. The majority 
and concurring opinions give every indication that, had New York 
law required religious organizations and the like to pay property 
taxes and apply to the state for a subsequent refund, the Court 
would probably have concluded that the law violated the First 
Amendment. However, because the financial benefit to religion was 
by way of tax exemption—even though economically equivalent to a 
direct grant to religion—the Court upheld New York’s tax exemp-
tion law as constitutionally permissible since it was the best way to 
avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. Impor-
tantly, there was no issue raised by either the majority or the dissent 
about whether the tax benefit, here a property tax exemption, was a 
form of financial assistance to religion. 
2. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist 
Another First Amendment religion case in which the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of the equivalence of tax benefits and di-
rect expenditures was Committee for Public Education and Religious 
 
Whether direct aid or subsidies entail that degree of involvement that is prohibited 
by the Constitution is a question that must be reserved for a later case upon a record 
that fully develops all the pertinent considerations such as the significance and char-
acter of subsidies in our political system and the role of the government in adminis-
tering the subsidy in relation to the particular program aided. It may also be that the 
States, while bound to observe strict neutrality, should be freer to experiment with 
involvement—on a neutral basis—than the Federal Government.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 240. Id. at 704 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 241. See id. “A tax exemption is a subsidy. Is my Brother Brennan correct in saying that 
we would hold that state or federal grants to churches, say, to construct the edifice itself would 
be unconstitutional? What is the difference between that kind of subsidy and the present sub-
sidy?” Id. 
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Liberty v. Nyquist.242 Contrary to Walz where the Court concluded 
that granting a property tax exemption avoided excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion, the Court in Nyquist concluded 
that the income tax benefits offered to parents of school age children 
increased government entanglement with religion. However, consis-
tent with this article’s thesis, none of the Justices in Nyquist ques-
tioned whether the tax benefits were financial assistance to religion, 
only whether the degree of assistance was excessive.243 
In Nyquist, an unincorporated association and several individual 
taxpayers raised Establishment Clause challenges to certain New 
York laws establishing financial aid programs for private grade 
schools in the state.244 The programs included direct grants to private 
schools,245 tuition reimbursements to low-income parents paying pri-
vate school tuition,246 and income tax benefits for other parents pay-
ing private school tuition.247 The legislative purpose for the amend-
ments was to satisfy the state’s “responsibility to ensure the health, 
welfare and safety of [private school] children” and to “express[] a 
dedication to the ‘vitality of our pluralistic society.’”248 A substantial 
majority of the schools benefiting from the various programs were 
religious.249 A federal district court invalidated the direct grant and 
 
 242. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
 243. Interestingly, the seminal case that defines the phrase “receiving federal financial 
assistance” as used in federal civil rights statutes also relies on the principal of economic equiva-
lence established in Nyquist, Mueller, and similar religion clause cases. See Grove City College 
v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). Citing Mueller and Nyquist, the Court in Grove City College 
states that “[t]he economic effect of direct and indirect assistance often is indistinguishable  
. . . .” Id. at 565. 
 244. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 761–62. 
 245. The direct grants provisions provided for direct money grants from the State to 
“qualifying” private schools to be used for appropriate maintenance and repair purposes to en-
sure the health welfare and safety of private school students. See id. at 762. “A ‘qualifying’ 
school is any nonpublic nonprofit elementary or secondary school which has been designated 
during the [immediately preceding] year as serving a high concentration of pupils from low-
income families for purposes of Title IV of the Federal Higher Education Act of nineteen hun-
dred sixty-five . . . .” Id. at 762–63 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 425). 
 246. The tuition reimbursements provision provided for tuition reimbursements to par-
ents of children attending private grade schools if the parents had an annual taxable income of 
less than $5,000. See id. at 764. 
 247. The income tax benefits provision provided tax relief to parents who failed to qualify 
for tuition reimbursement by permitting these parents to subtract from their adjusted gross 
income for state income tax purposes a designated amount for each dependent for whom they 
paid private school tuition. See id. at 765. Thus, the tax benefit provision was not a traditional 
type of tax deduction because the deductible amount was a function of a statutory amount, not 
the amount actually expended by the taxpayer. See id. at 790. 
 248. Id. at 763–65. 
 249. The Court notes that “[s]ome 700,000 to 800,000 students, constituting almost 
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tuition reimbursement portions of the amendments as violating the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment but upheld the in-
come tax benefits provisions.250 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court invalidated all three 
portions of the amendments, refusing to insulate the tax benefits 
provisions from the same scrutiny shared by the other cash expendi-
ture provisions.251 As a testament to the economic equivalence of tax 
benefits and direct financial assistance, Justice Powell, for the major-
ity, found little substantive difference between the tax benefits provi-
sion and the tuition reimbursements provision invalidated by the 
lower court.252 Both provisions, according to Powell, were intended 
to be comparable and compatible such that all parents of children at-
tending private grade schools would receive roughly equal amounts 
as a benefit, either in the form of a reimbursement or as reduction in 
tax liability.253 Thus, for Justice Powell, there was no practical reason 
to distinguish one form of aid to religion (tuition reimbursements) 
 
20% of the State’s entire elementary and secondary school population, attend over 2,000 non-
public schools, approximately 85% of which are church affiliated.” Id. at 768. 
 250. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 251. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 769 
(1973). 
 252. However, Justice Powell did note that labeling the tax benefits as credits or deduc-
tions was helpful but not decisive: 
In this Court, the parties have engaged in a considerable debate over what label best 
fits the New York law. Appellants insist that the law is, in effect, one establishing a 
system of tax “credits.” The State and the intervenors reject that characterization 
and would label it, instead, a system of income tax “modifications.” The Solicitor 
General, in an amicus curiae brief filed in this Court, has referred throughout to the 
New York law as one authorizing tax “deductions.” The District Court majority 
found that the aid was “in effect a tax credit.” . . . We see no reason to select one la-
bel over another, as the constitutionality of this hybrid benefit does not turn in any 
event on the label we accord it . . . . Instead we must “examine the form of the rela-
tionship for the light that it casts on the substance.” 
Id. at 789–90 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. 
Supp. 655, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (emphasis in original)). 
 253. See id. at 790. The court stated: 
These sections allow parents of children attending nonpublic elementary and secon-
dary schools to subtract from adjusted gross income a specified amount if they do 
not receive a tuition reimbursement . . . and if they have an adjusted gross income of 
less than $25,000. The amount of the deduction is . . . calculated on the basis of a 
formula contained in the statute. The formula is apparently the product of a legisla-
tive attempt to assure that each family would receive a carefully estimated net bene-
fit, and that the tax benefit would be comparable to, and compatible with, the tui-
tion grant for lower income families. 
Id. 
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from another (tax deductions, credits, etc.). In both cases, “the 
money involved represents a charge made upon the state for the pur-
pose of religious education.”254 Once economic equivalency was es-
tablished, Powell went on to explain why the tax benefits in Nyquist 
were excessive for First Amendment purposes whereas the tax bene-
fits in Walz were consistent with notions of government religious 
neutrality.255 
3. Mueller v. Allen 
In Mueller v. Allen, the Supreme Court again espouses the view 
that tax benefits are economically equivalent to direct expenditures, 
though not constitutionally equivalent.256 In Mueller, a group of 
Minnesota taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of a Minnesota 
statute that permitted taxpayers to take a deduction on their state in-
come taxes for certain tuition and transportation expenses incurred 
in educating their children.257 The taxpayers claimed the statute vio-
 
 254. Id. at 790–91 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 
350 F. Supp. 655, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (Hayes, J., dissenting)). 
 255. In distinguishing the tax exemptions approved in Walz from the tax benefits at issue 
in Nyquist, Justice Powell emphasized the historical roots of the property tax exemptions as 
compared to the lack of historical support for the tax benefits in Nyquist. See id. at 792 (“We 
know of no historical precedent for New York’s recently promulgated tax relief program.”). 
Further, while the tax exemption in Walz, according to Justice Powell, “constitute[d] a rea-
sonable and balanced attempt to guard against” the dangers of taxing religion, the special tax 
benefits in Nyquist “cannot be squared with the principle of neutrality.” Id. at 793 (quoting 
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)). Thus, if the tax exemption in Walz were 
eliminated, the involvement of government in religion would be expanded “by giving rise to 
tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and 
conflicts that follow in the train of those legal processes.” Id. (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674). 
However, the granting of the special tax benefits in Nyquist tended to increase the involvement 
between religion and government by mandating certain actions of religion and government 
that would not otherwise have to be taken. See id. Finally, the tax exemption in Walz was avail-
able to a broad class of potential beneficiaries, whereas the tax benefits in Nyquist were utilized 
primarily by parents of private religious school students. See id. at 793–94. 
 256. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
 257. See id. at 390–91. Minnesota’s law permitted taxpayers to deduct the following as 
tuition and transportation expenses: 
The amount . . . paid to others . . . for each dependent [in grade school], for tui-
tion, textbooks and transportation of each dependent in attending [a grade school] 
situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a 
resident of this state may legally fulfill the state’s compulsory attendance laws, which 
is not operated for profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, ‘textbooks’ shall mean and 
include books and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary 
and secondary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught 
in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include in-
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lated the Establishment Clause by providing financial assistance to 
religious schools.258 The Commissioner of Minnesota’s Department 
of Revenue agreed, among other things, that substantially all of the 
private schools in Minnesota at which the deductible expenses were 
incurred considered themselves religious.259 The district court and 
the court of appeals disagreed with the taxpayers and determined 
that Minnesota’s tax deduction statute was neutral with respect to 
either establishing or inhibiting religion.260 The Supreme Court 
agreed with the lower courts and upheld the statute.261 
The majority in Mueller concluded that Minnesota’s tax deduc-
tion was not constitutionally equivalent to a direct government ex-
penditure because the deduction did not have “the primary effect of 
advancing the sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools.”262 Neverthe-
less, the Court never questioned the economic equivalence of those 
 
structional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or 
worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or worship . . . . 
Id. at 390 n.1 (citing MINN. STAT. § 290.09 (1982)). 
 258. See id. at 392. 
 259. See id. at 391 (“[A]pproximately 91,000 elementary and secondary students at-
tended some 500 privately supported schools located in Minnesota, and about 95% of these 
students attended schools considering themselves to be sectarian.”). 
 260. The District Court held that Minnesota’s tax deduction statute was “neutral on its 
face and in its application and does not have a primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting 
religion.” Id. at 392 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (D. Minn. 1981)). 
The Court of Appeals likewise upheld the statute, concluding that it benefited a “broad class of 
Minnesota citizens.” Id. (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1205 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
 261. See id. at 391. 
 262. Id. at 396 (quoting Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 
(1980) and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)). Justice Rehnquist noted that 
the tax deduction in Mueller was one among many tax deductions available to citizens of Min-
nesota. Unlike the tax benefits for middle-income taxpayers in Nyquist, which tried to ap-
proximate the reimbursements to low-income tax payers, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that 
the “genuine” tax deduction available under Minnesota’s tax law reflected the legislature’s at-
tempt to achieve “an equitable distribution of the tax burden.” See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396 
(citing Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)). Cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 769 (1973) (“The amount of the deduction is unre-
lated to the amount of money actually expended by any parent on tuition, but is calculated on 
the basis of a formula contained in the statute. The formula is apparently the product of a legis-
lative attempt to assure that each family would receive a carefully estimated net benefit, and 
that the tax benefit would be comparable to, and compatible with, the tuition grant for lower 
income families.”). Justice Rehnquist also noted that, unlike the tax benefits in Nyquist, the 
Minnesota education expense tax deduction was available to “all parents, including those 
whose children attend[ed] public schools and those whose children attend[ed] nonsectarian 
private schools or sectarian private schools.” Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397. Additionally, the fact 
that Minnesota’s tax deduction was available to parents—who independently chose whether to 
send their children to a religious school or not—greatly reduced any potential Establishment 
Clause objections. See id. at 399. 
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tax deduction benefits to direct expenditures. Indeed, when Justice 
Marshall in his dissent criticizes the majority’s holding, he does so 
not because the majority failed to find that Minnesota’s tax deduc-
tion was an economic benefit to religious schools.263 Rather, Mar-
shall criticizes the majority for failing to abide by the Court’s prece-
dent in Nyquist that forbids any financial benefit—direct or indirect, 
tax or non-tax—that subsidizes tuition payments to sectarian schools 
because such benefits have “a direct and immediate effect of advanc-
ing religion.”264 In Marshall’s view, there is no difference between a 
direct government payment and a tax benefit “[for] the purposes of 
determining whether such aid has the effect of advancing relig-
ion.”265 What matters, according to Marshall, is whether the substan-
tive impact of the benefit is to aid or advance religion.266 
4. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock 
In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, the Court again relies on the 
economic equivalence of tax benefits and direct expenditures as a basis 
for engaging in an analysis regarding constitutional equivalence.267 
Texas Monthly involved the Supreme Court’s review of a Texas sales 
 
 263. See id. at 404–17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 264. Id. at 405. 
 265. Id. at 407 (citing Nyquist, 493 U.S. at 790–91). 
 266. See id. at 408 (citing Nyquist, 493 U.S. at 793). Justice Marshall dismissed the ma-
jority’s attempts to distinguish Nyquist on the grounds that Minnesota’s tax deduction was 
available to all parents and New York’s tax benefit was limited to private school parents. The 
practical result in both cases is that the government offsets tuition—the largest expense in both 
states. See id. at 408–09 (“The statute is little more than a subsidy of tuition masquerading as a 
subsidy of general educational expenses. The other deductible expenses are de minimis in 
comparison to tuition expenses.”). The tuition offsets families who are more religious. See id. 
at 409 (“Of the total number of taxpayers who are eligible for the tuition deduction, approxi-
mately 96% send their children to religious schools.”). And for those families with children in 
private schools. Id. at 409 (“Fewer than 100 of more than 900,000 school-age children in 
Minnesota attend public schools that charge a general tuition.”). Justice Marshall also dis-
missed the majority’s characterization of Minnesota’s law as a “genuine tax deduction” as 
compared to New York’s “special tax benefit.” Marshall viewed the majority’s argument on 
this point as a “distinction without a difference” because the financial impact of both tax bene-
fits on religion is the same. Id. at 411–12. Justice Marshall states: 
Like the tax benefit held impermissible in Nyquist, the tax deduction at issue here 
concededly was designed to “[encourage] desirable expenditures for educational 
purposes.” Of equal importance, as the majority also concedes, the “economic [con-
sequence]” of these programs is the same, for in each case the “financial assistance” 
provided to parents ultimately has an economic effect comparable to that of aid 
given directly to the schools. 
Id. at 412 (quoting Nyquist, 493 U.S. at 396, 397 n.6, 399). 
 267. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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tax exemption applying exclusively to religious periodicals published 
or distributed by a religious faith.268 No similar exemption existed for 
nonreligious publishers and distributors.269 A nonreligious publisher 
in Texas challenged the constitutionality of the special sales tax ex-
emption for religious publishers, claiming that it violated the First 
Amendment.270 Texas’s appellate court upheld the religious exemp-
tion statute, claiming that it served a secular purpose, did not ad-
vance religion, and did not result in excessive entanglement of relig-
ion with government.271 On appeal, the United States Supreme 
Court, in a plurality opinion, reversed the state court’s ruling and in-
validated the religious exemption statute on First Amendment 
grounds.272 
As in its previous First Amendment cases addressing tax benefits 
for religion, the Court in Texas Monthly uniformly accepted that tax 
benefits are economically equivalent to direct government expendi-
tures. Justice Brennan, for the plurality, noted that every tax benefit 
is a subsidy of sorts that forces non-benefited taxpayers to become 
“indirect and vicarious ‘donors’” to those benefited.273 Similarly, Jus-
tice Scalia, for the dissent, notes that “a sales tax exemption aids re-
 
 268. See id. at 5. “Texas exempted from its sales tax ‘[p]eriodicals that are published or 
distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of 
the faith and books that consist wholly of writings sacred to a religious faith.’” Id. (quoting 
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 (1982)). 
 269. See id. 
 270. See id. at 6 (“[A]ppellant paid sales taxes of $ 149,107.74 under protest and sued to 
recover those payments in state court.”). 
 271. See id. at 6–7 (citing Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 731 S.W.2d 160 (1987)). 
 272. See id. at 7. Justice Brennan, for the plurality, concluded that Texas’ sales tax 
exemption for religious periodicals lacked “sufficient breadth to pass scrutiny under the Estab-
lishment Clause.” Id. at 14. Unlike the broad state property tax exemptions approved in Walz 
v. Tax Commission, which applied to a variety of religious and secular entities, Justice Brennan 
noted in Texas Monthly that Texas’ sales tax exemption only applied to religious entities doing 
religious works. See id. at 12. In distinguishing Walz, Justice Brennan states: 
Finally, we emphasized in Walz that in granting a property tax deduction, the State 
“has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as 
such; rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of religious worship within a 
broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasipublic corporations which include 
hospitals, libraries, play-grounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic 
groups.” The breadth of New York’s property tax exemption was essential to our 
holding that it was “not aimed at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion,” 
but rather possessed the legitimate secular purpose and effect of contributing to the 
community’s moral and intellectual diversity and encouraging private groups to un-
dertake projects that advanced the community’s well-being and that would other-
wise have to be funded by tax revenues or left undone. 
Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673-74 (1970) (footnote omitted)). 
 273. Id. (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983)). 
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ligion, since it makes it less costly for religions to disseminate their 
beliefs.”274 In Texas Monthly, agreement that the tax benefits eco-
nomically benefit religion is where common ground among the jus-
tices ended. According to the plurality, if the tax benefit subsidy is 
conferred on a wide variety of religious and nonreligious groups for a 
proper secular purpose, the fact that religion incidentally benefits 
“does not deprive the subsidy of the secular purpose and primary ef-
fect mandated by the Establishment Clause.”275 According to Justice 
Scalia, a significant constitutional difference between otherwise eco-
nomically equivalent tax benefits and direct benefits is the level of 
state involvement with religion.276 
Does the “excessive state involvement with religion” issue raised 
in Walz, Nyquist, Mueller, and Texas Monthly, which is extremely 
important for First Amendment constitutional law purposes, matter 
for purposes of determining if a private actor is a recipient of FFA 
under federal civil rights statutes? No. Under the Grove City College 
conception of FFA, the important thing for civil rights statutory pur-
poses is that the private entity receive direct or indirect financial 
benefit from a government source and that Congress intends to 
benefit the private entity. In its religion clause cases, the Court is try-
ing to be neutral towards religion by balancing religious liberty with 
government endorsement of particular religions.277 In contrast, in 
the civil rights statutory context, the Court is primarily concerned 
with remaining true to Congress’s express desires regarding which 
governmental programs constitute FFA and are, thereby, covered by 
the relevant civil rights statute. Once it is determined that an eco-
nomic benefit is transferred from government to a private entity for 
 
 274. Id. at 42. 
 275. Id. at 15. According to Justice Brennan, when government voluntarily grants a sub-
sidy exclusively to religion, as Texas did, it “provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to re-
ligious organizations.” Id. at 15 (citing Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
judgment))—especially where the subsidy is targeted at “writings that promulgate the teach-
ings of religious faiths.” Id. at 15. Thus, Justice Brennan concluded that “because Texas’ sales 
tax exemption for periodicals promulgating the teaching of any religious sect lacks a secular 
objective that would justify this preference along with similar benefits for nonreligious publica-
tions or groups,” the exemption violates the Establishment Clause. Id. at 17. Justice Brennan 
did not address the Free Press issue because his resolution of the Establishment Clause issue 
resolved the case. See id. at 17 n.7. 
 276. See id. at 43. 
 277. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (“In distinguishing between indoctri-
nation that is attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently 
turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups 
or persons without regard to their religion.”). 
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non-income-defining purposes, the only remaining issue is whether 
Congress intended to provide such a benefit. True, the Court “has 
been reticent to adopt tax expenditure analysis for constitutional de-
cision-making [sic]”278 and “has equivocated”279 on the issue of con-
stitutional equivalence.280 However, the justices would likely uni-
formly accept that tax benefits are economically equivalent to other 
forms of government funding under federal civil rights statutes.281 
C. Limitations of the Equivalence Concept Espoused by Tax 
Expenditure Theory 
In sum, the various Supreme Court justices, like many scholars, 
agree that the equivalence concept espoused by tax expenditure the-
ory has its limits in the constitutional context. Due to concerns at is-
sue in constitutional cases, tax expenditure theory’s equivalence con-
cept may or may not be helpful to a court deciding how to treat tax 
benefits for constitutional law purposes. For example, a finding of 
excessive government involvement with religion is critical to 
concluding that government funding violates the First Amendment. 
However, excessive government involvement is not a serious concern 
under federal civil rights statutes. Maybe the scholars’ calls for less 
strict adherence to tax expenditure theory in constitutional cases is 
appropriate? This article is not intended to resolve that issue. Rather, 
this article simply intends to show that economic equivalence for 
purposes of interpreting federal civil rights statutes is quite different 
from constitutional equivalence. State involvement is not significant 
for purposes of defining FFA in the statutory civil rights context. For 
purposes of appropriately interpreting federal civil rights statutes, 
what matters is whether the government has provided financial bene-
fit to a private party and whether Congress intended that the finan-
cial benefit support the private party’s activities. If so, the relevant 
statute, for example Title IX, applies, and the private individual is en-
titled to have her liberties protected. In short, tax expenditure theory 
 
 278. See Sugin, supra note 22, at 411 n.20 (“The Court has been reticent to adopt tax 
expenditure analysis as a basis for constitutional decionmaking, despite repeated invitations. 
The Court has shown that it clearly understands the economic equivalence of tax subsidies and 
direct subsidies.”). 
 279. See Zelinsky, supra note 22, at 380–81 (“The Court itself has equivocated, equating 
tax benefits and direct spending in some constitutional cases but not in others without indicat-
ing a rationale for such a seemingly inconsistent approach.”). 
 280. See TWR, 461 U.S. 540, 544 n.5 (1983) (“In stating that exemptions and deduc-
tions, on the one hand, are like cash subsidies, on the other, we of course do not mean to as-
sert that they are in all respects identical.” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
 281. See discussion supra note 243. 
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can and should be used to equate tax benefits received by charities 
with government grants and loans received by various private parties. 
V. DISTINGUISHING TAX BENEFITS FOR CHARITIES FROM TAX 
BENEFITS FOR NON-CHARITIES AND INDIVIDUALS 
Treating tax benefits for charities as FFA can and should be 
done. However, one potential problem might arise that must be ad-
dressed in the future: how to explain why noncharity and individual 
recipients of tax benefits should not also be treated as recipients of 
FFA under federal civil rights statutes. 
Tax benefits include more than those tax benefits that are the 
subject of this article (e.g., the income tax exemption for charities282 
and income tax deductions for persons making contributions to 
charities).283 Other types of tax benefits include income tax exemp-
tions for noncharitable entities,284 income tax deductions for pay-
ments other than to charities,285 income tax credits,286 and a variety 
of tax benefits offered by state and local governments.287 These other 
tax benefits, like the tax benefits enjoyed exclusively by charities, also 
provide an economic benefit to their recipients who include indi-
viduals and organizations alike. Thus, one might ask: “Should these 
other tax benefits also be treated as FFA under appropriate federal 
civil rights statutes?” Could treating these other tax benefits as FFA 
mean, for example, that individuals receiving home interest tax de-
ductions, business leagues receiving federal income tax exemptions, 
and individuals receiving various federal income tax credits would be 
subject to restrictions imposed by civil rights statutes that apply to 
recipients of FFA? 
The analysis in this article is not intended to apply to tax benefits 
for noncharities or individuals. Although noncharity and individual 
tax benefits provide economic favor to their recipients, the concern 
here is whether Congress intended this economic benefit to subject 
these recipients to coverage under federal civil rights statutes. Unlike 
 
 282. See I.R.C. § 501(a) (2000). 
 283. See id. § 170(a)(1). 
 284. These include (among others): social welfare organizations, labor organizations, 
business leagues, social clubs, fraternal beneficiary societies, domestic fraternal societies, non-
profit cemetery companies, and mutual credit unions. See id. § 501(c)(4)–(8), (10), (13)–(14). 
 285. See, e.g., id. § 163(a) (home mortgage interest deduction). 
 286. See, e.g., id. § 21 (the earned income tax credit). 
 287. State and local governments offer a panoply of tax benefits, including many of the 
same type of benefits offered by the federal government plus several others like property tax 
exemptions (as in Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)) and sales tax exemptions (as in 
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989)). 
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charities that receive special tax treatment because of the particular 
public benefit purposes they serve,288 many noncharities like business 
leagues are tax-exempt because they are inappropriate objects of 
taxation and, hence, are not exempt for social policy reasons. 
Accordingly, these noncharitable mutual benefit organizations that 
are exempt from the income tax do not receive the type of tax bene-
fit that, under tax expenditure theory, is equivalent to a direct grant 
of government funds. Similarly, there is no clear indication that Con-
gress intended that individuals receiving tax deductions and tax cred-
its be covered by civil rights statutes applying to recipients of FFA. 
These civil rights statutes apply to any “program or activity receiving 
‘FFA.’” Did Congress intend that an individual would ordinarily 
constitute a program or activity under these statutes? Likely not.289 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Courts should treat tax benefits received by charities as a form of 
FFA under federal civil rights statutes. FFA is a federal statutory 
term.290 Like any statutory term, it is subject to definition by either 
statute, agency interpretation, or court interpretation. No federal 
statute defines the phrase FFA. The prevailing agency interpretation 
of the term provides that FFA generally refers to government grants 
and loans.291 To date, no agency interpretation, at least in regulation 
form, indicates whether tax benefits are, or are not, a form of FFA. 
Nor is it likely that any agency will, of its own accord, adopt the view 
that tax benefits are FFA. Thus, court interpretation is the only 
mechanism by which tax benefits might be equated with FFA. 
The premier case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the 
phrase FFA is Grove City College v. Bell.292 The Court there con-
cluded that the term FFA includes direct or indirect financial bene-
fits. Further, the Court stated that this statutory term is not limited 
in scope, except to the extent that Congress so limits it. Given that 
Congress has never expressed the view that FFA does not include tax 
benefits, it is reasonable—indeed, logical—to conclude that tax 
benefits are a form of financial support. 
 
 288. See discussion supra notes 38–48 and accompanying text. 
 289. Cf. Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 38–39 (2d Cir. 1983) (concluding that 
social security benefit recipients are not covered by Title VI as “recipients of federal financial 
assistants” because Congress did not intend so). 
 290. See discussion supra notes 102–18 and accompanying text. 
 291. See discussion supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 292. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984); see also discussion supra notes 
130–56 and accompanying text. 
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Of the few courts that have addressed the issue, only one, 
McGlotten v. Connally, reached the conclusion that tax benefits are a 
form of FFA.293 However, McGlotten goes too far by concluding that 
tax benefits are equivalent to government expenditures for civil 
rights statutory purposes as well as for constitutional law purposes.294 
This article contends that a private party is not transformed into a 
state actor merely because that party is tax-exempt and has the right 
to receive tax deductible contributions. Nevertheless, McGlotten is 
useful because it demonstrates how tax expenditure theory can be 
used to expand statutory civil rights protections to include tax bene-
fits as an indirect form of FFA that the Court recognized as appro-
priate in Grove City College. True to tax expenditure theory, how-
ever, the McGlotten court does not go so far as to equate tax benefits 
received by social clubs with government grants and loans because 
these type of tax benefits merely help to define the tax base and are 
not intended to accomplish any social policy.295 
Tax expenditure theory clearly supports the idea that tax benefits 
received by charities can and should be equated with government 
grants and loans under certain federal civil rights statutes. While the 
United States Supreme Court has never had occasion to address the 
particular statutory equivalence issue raised by this article, it has ad-
dressed the equivalence issue in various constitutional law contexts. 
In each of these contexts, something other than economic equiva-
lence of tax benefits and direct expenditures dictated the Court’s 
conclusion.296 For example, in its religion clause cases, the Court ul-
timately decides the equivalence issue based primarily on the effect of 
the tax benefit on government entanglement with religion, a non-
economic matter.297 
The Court’s equivalency decisions are generally consistent with 
recent academic commentary calling for a restrained or watered-
down version of tax expenditure theory similar to that implemented 
by the court in McGlotten. This academic commentary suggests 
(along the same lines as McGlotten) that tax benefits and economi-
cally equivalent government expenditures should only be treated as 
legally equivalent to the extent that other non-economic factors are 
not of paramount importance. Economic benefit is the ultimate and 
primary concern when making a legal determination about whether 
 
 293. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); see also discussion 
supra notes 160–87 and accompanying text. 
 294. See discussion supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text. 
 295. See discussion supra notes 172–77 and accompanying text. 
 296. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 297. See discussion supra Part III.A.1. 
4BRE-FIN.DOC 3/29/01  11:53 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
228 
any form of benefit—tax or non-tax—is FFA under relevant civil 
rights statutes. 
In addition to explaining how the statutory term FFA can be in-
terpreted to include tax benefits received by charities, this article also 
focuses on why such inclusion is a good thing for society.298 If a pri-
vate charity wants to wrongfully discriminate against persons because 
of their race, gender, disability, or similar personal characteristic, we 
as a society must face the question of how to prevent it from doing 
so. If we try to pass federal laws that explicitly prohibit such dis-
crimination, whether or not the charity is receiving federal assistance, 
we may run into trouble. Congress may not have the power, either 
under the Commerce Clause or the enforcement clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, to reach such action by charities. Nevertheless, 
Congress does not have to subsidize such discrimination. Thus, 
Congress can use the Spending Clause and its taxing power as a form 
of policy leverage to discourage invidious discrimination by private 
charities. This is done all the time both in civil rights laws and in tax 
laws. The approach suggested by this article says to charities: “Dis-
criminate if you choose, but not with federal subsidies.” This ap-
proach advances and extends, in a lawful and clear fashion, the moral 
and political agenda against discrimination the Supreme Court 
sought to advance in Bob Jones University v. United States. 
Currently, the only civil rights restrictions imposed on private 
charities are those that emanate from federal civil rights statutes and 
the public policy limitation announced by the Supreme Court in Bob 
Jones University v. United States. However, these existing civil rights 
protections, individually and collectively, are inadequate. For exam-
ple, many federal civil rights statutes only apply to the extent that a 
private actor receives FFA. Because courts and agencies do not con-
sistently interpret this statutory phrase as including tax benefits, these 
federal civil rights statutes do not apply to many charities—at least 
not those that do not receive traditional forms of federal assistance 
like government grants or loans. Additionally, the Bob Jones Univer-
sity court’s public policy limitation is inadequate because it lacks suf-
ficient legal authority and a clearly defined scope of applicability. 
These inadequacies combine to create a civil rights framework that 
does not fully satisfy its protection potential. Using tax expenditure 
theory as a guide, this article concludes that interpreting FFA as in-
cluding tax benefits would go a long way towards alleviating this so-
cial justice inadequacy. 
 
 
 298. See discussion supra Part I. 
